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THE DETENTION, CONFINEMENT, AND
INCARCERATION OF PREGNANT WOMEN
FOR THE BENEFIT OF FETAL HEALTH
APRIL L. CHERRY*
In 1998, Yuriko Kawaguchi appeared before Cleveland, Ohio
Municipal Court Judge Patricia Cleary and entered a guilty plea to a fifth-
degree felony forgery count resulting from her use of a counterfeit credit
card. Approximately two weeks before her sentencing hearing, Ms.
Kawaguchi wrote to Judge Cleary, informing the judge that she was
pregnant and wished to end her pregnancy by obtaining an abortion. At the
sentencing hearing the judge objected to the defendant's plans to obtain an
abortion and offered her a "quid pro quo" deal. If the defendant agreed to
bring the fetus to term, Judge Cleary promised to sentence her to probation.
If Ms. Kawaguchi insisted on having the abortion, then the Judge indicated
that she would sentence Ms. Kawaguchi to a prison term of six months. Ms.
Kawaguchi refused "the deal." By the time Ms. Kawaguchi was released by
an order of the Eighth District Court of Appeals granting bond, she was too
far along in her pregnancy to obtain a legal abortion in the State of Ohio.'
It is difficult, if not impossible, to know whether cases as egregious
as Ms. Kawaguchi's are common in American courts because such quid pro
quo "deals" between judges and criminal defendants usually are not on the
record. Nevertheless, we do know that some judges use incarceration, and
threats thereof, to control the behavior of pregnant women who come before
them in order to protect the fetuses. Some pregnant women who pose no
risk to their fetuses come before judges as a result of crimes that are
completely unrelated to their pregnancies, as in the case of Ms. Kawaguchi.
Other pregnant women are before judges on civil or criminal charges
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland
State University. Thanks to colleagues Patricia J. Falk and Lolita Buckner Inniss for
insightful comments on previous drafts, and to students Tiffany Anderson, Jennifer
Armstrong, and Kara Brown for their helpful research. This paper is dedicated to Lynn
Paltrow, a tireless advocate for women who have been least able to advocate for themselves.
All mistakes and omissions are mine alone.
1 These facts were taken from Cleveland Bar Association v. Cleary, 754 N.E.2d
235 (Ohio 2001). See also Ohio v. Kawaguchi, 739 N.E.2d 392 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
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related to their use of alcohol or illicit drugs-behavior that is believed to
be detrimental to their fetuses. Others become involved with the state when
their doctors report their non-conforming behavior, sometimes drug-related,
to state social service agencies. Finally, others become involved with state
agencies because their behaviors are restricted by state statutes designed to
protect fetuses from the improvident behaviors of their mothers. Regardless
of how these women become involved with the court or other state actors,
judges use their power to detain women as a way to influence pregnancy-
related decisions.
In Kawaguchi, the judge used incarceration to "encourage" the
pregnant defendant to bring her fetus to term; in the end, incarceration
prevented Ms. Kawaguchi from obtaining an abortion. In other cases, in
hopes of benefiting the fetuses, judges have used incarceration as a way to
prevent drug use by pregnant addicts.2 Judges have also used incarceration,
detention, orders of hospital confinement, and threats thereof, to compel
pregnant women to access prenatal care or to submit to their physicians'
directions regarding medical treatment for the benefit of fetal health,3 even
when such medical care is contrary to the pregnant woman's deeply held
religious beliefs.4 In every case, detention of the pregnant woman is
predicated on some version of fetal rights and is meant to influence the
pregnant woman's decision regarding the course of her pregnancy. Surely,
in some cases, the threat of detention, confinement, or incarceration for the
fetus's sake must inevitably lead some women to forego pregnancy
altogether or to abort a fetus to avoid confinement. Finally, detentions,
confinement, and incarceration for the sake of fetal health result in the
normalization or standardization of motherhood. Only those who meet the
state-enforced standard are permitted to reproduce without state
interference. In the end, all of these detentions violate the pregnant
woman's reproductive rights-rights to privacy and bodily integrity.
Detention and commitment for the benefit of fetal health reduces pregnant
women from citizens to "fetal containers" and "maternal environments. 5
2 See infra notes 117-132 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 51-116 and accompanying text.
4 See Frank J. Murray, Pregnant Woman in Custody After Refusing a Medial
Exam, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2000, at A4; Pamela Ferdinand, Pregnant Sect Member
Detained for Health Care, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2000, at A4; David Abel, Pregnant Sect
Member in State Custody, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1, 2000, at Al.
5 Many commentators have noted that pregnant women are reduced to pregnant
"maternal environments" and "fetal containers" in obstetrical literature. See, e.g., Caroline
Morris, Technology and the Legal Discourse of Fetal Autonomy, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 47,
[Vol. 16:1
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At the heart of these confinements lies the belief that the pregnant
woman's behavior has a negative long-term effect on the health of the fetus.
This assumption is often fallacious, particularly when applied to the use of
illicit drugs.6 Nevertheless, these restrictions of women's physical liberty
are poor solutions to the problem of maternal drug and alcohol use or other
maternal behaviors that may result in poor fetal outcomes. In addition to a
lack of significantly better fetal outcomes, detention inappropriately
violates these women's physical bodily integrity and restricts their
reproductive decision making. This Article argues that all these methods-
detention, confinement, and incarceration-violate women's constitutional
rights and in the end leaves a jurisprudence of physical integrity and
reproductive rights that permits coercive action on the part of the state, even
when non-coercion is the principal constitutional norm and a necessary
prerequisite of democratic citizenship.7
This Article examines both the state's role in the detention,
confinement, and incarceration of pregnant women for the purported benefit
of fetal health, the constitutionality of these actions, and the rights the state
endangers when it does act. Although this Article is about rights, it
recognizes the potential dangers of rights discourse. Rights discourse can be
at the very least disingenuous, if not dangerous, particularly when the
conditions of rights are disconnected from the real needs of the people they
are ostensibly intended to protect. Such disconnection results in either
97 n.61 (1997) (noting that women are referred to as "maternal environments" in modem
obstetrical practice); BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND
TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 19-23 (1989) (noting the increasingly
commoditized language used to describe pregnant women); Barbara Katz Rothman, When a
Pregnant Woman Endangers Her Fetus, 16 HASTING CTR. REP. 24, 24-25 (Feb. 1986)
(noting that women are referred to as "maternal environments" in modem obstetrical
practice); George J. Annas, Pregnant Women as Fetal Containers, 16 HASTINGS CTR. REP.
13, 14 (Dec. 1986); Lucinda J. Peach, From Spiritual Descriptions to Legal Prescriptions:
Religious Imagery of Woman as "'Fetal Container" in the Law, 10 J. L. & RELIGION 73, 76
(1994) (arguing that pregnant women are treated as fetal containers in legal discourse);
Charles A. Gardner, Is an Embryo a Person, NATION, Nov. 13, 1989, at 558 (referring to
pregnant woman as a "maternal environment").
6 For further discussion, see infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text. See also,
LAURA E. GOMEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS, AND THE
POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE (1997).
7 See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 3 (3d ed. 2005) (asserting that constitutional liberty consists of freedom from
government coercion and freedom to participate in government).
2007]
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injustice or limited substantive justice.8 In the cases of pregnant women
who are confined or detained for the benefit of their fetuses,9 rights
discourse can divert our attention away from the social and economic
conditions under which women live. Moreover, it can divert our attention
away from the ways in which these women experience pregnancy and
childbirth.' ° Nevertheless, rights discourse also can be of great assistance in
the fight for social change." In the circumstance of the detention and
confinement of pregnant women for the purported benefit of fetal health,
rights discourse has considerable merit. It recognizes both injustice and the
social and economic conditions under which many women live.
Furthermore, it reveals the very real need of women for social change by
requiring respect for the bodies of women, refusing to objectify women and
their bodies, and resisting the transformation of women into mere fetal
containers.
Section One of this Article discusses the effect of drug policy on
the detention and confinement of pregnant women. This section also
outlines three types of "fetal protection measures" that result in the
detention, confinement, or incarceration of pregnant women in the name of
fetal health and examines the legal rationales behind these mechanisms.
Section One then questions whether detention is an effective way to reach
the state's articulated goal of better fetal outcomes. Section Two offers a
discussion of the constitutional rights at issue. This section addresses the
ways in which detention violates two essential components of women's
8 See April L. Cherry, The Free Exercise Rights of Pregnant Women Who Refuse
Medical Treatment, 69 TENN. L. REV. 563, 566-67 (2002) [hereinafter Cherry, Free Exercise
Rights]; April L. Cherry, A Feminist Understanding of Sex-Selective Abortion: Solely a
Matter of Choice?, 10 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 161, 214 (1995) [hereinafter Cherry, A Feminist
Understanding]; see also John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire
Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
2129, 2215 (1992) ("This process whereby rights are defined by law, however, is
substantially isolated from the very needs that generated those rights and the values they
envisaged."); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from
Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 401, 404-05 (1987).
9 See Cherry, Free Exercise Rights, supra note 8, at 566-67 (making a similar
argument in the context of compelled medical treatment of pregnant women).
10 Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced
Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women, 59 TENN. L. REV. 487, 499 (1992) ("The call to
rights has made clear these cases ... could not occur but for the prior devaluation of women;
that 'fetal interests' is a proxy for majoritarian interests; and that the utilitarian balancing test
describes women as tools useful for serving the rest of society.").
1 Williams, supra note 8, at 404.
[Vol. 16:1
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rights: the right to be free from unwarranted detention and confinement and
the right to reproductive decision making that is based in both the privacy
and liberty doctrines. Section Two also focuses on the standards currently
used by the United States Supreme Court both to assess the constitutionality
of civil commitment, detention, and other types of confinement by the state
and to evaluate violations of women's reproductive rights. With respect to
the Court's detention and confinement jurisprudence, the Article examines
both United States v. Salerno12 and Addington v. Texas 3 and argues that the
physical restraint of non-compliant pregnant women is unconstitutional
because the state can neither articulate a satisfactory compelling interest nor
demonstrate that confinement is the least restrictive alternative available to
protect the state's interest.
With respect to reproductive rights jurisprudence, this Article
argues that the proper standard for review of these detentions is found in
Griswold v. Connecticut'4 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,15 cases in which the
Court articulated women's fundamental rights to reproductive decision
making outside of the context of abortion. In these cases the Court describes
privacy as a fundamental right with which the government cannot interfere
without a showing of a compelling state interest and a demonstration that
the government's chosen action is the alternative that is least restrictive of
the individual's right. The government fails on its requisite showing when
these standards are applied to the cases under discussion. This Article
argues that there is no compelling state interest in incarceration for fetal
protection and that detention is not the least restrictive alternative for these
women. Furthermore, this Article argues that the less protective standard
relating to abortion regulations, the undue burden standard articulated in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,' 6 while not applicable to these cases as they
do not relate to abortion, is also violated under the circumstances described
herein. At the very least, the undue burden standard must be read to mean
that the state cannot coerce a woman's reproductive decision making
without violating the rights of privacy and liberty. Because detention is
highly coercive of women's reproductive decision making, it must be
understood to violate the principles articulated by the Court in Casey.
12481 U.S. 739 (1987).
13441 U.S. 418 (1979).
14 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
16 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2007]
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Section Three suggests two additional ways of thinking about
privacy and liberty that may better protect women's physical integrity and
their other constitutional rights. First, the right to privacy should be viewed
as an affirmative right. Second, privacy should be understood as an anti-
totalitarian principle. Finally, this Article concludes by suggesting that
investing our energies in basic health care and drug treatment for pregnant
women is the more effective and constitutionally acceptable way to produce
better fetal outcomes.' 7
1. PUNISHING PREGNANT WOMEN FOR THE BENEFIT OF
FETAL HEALTH: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
The problem of poor fetal health is often blamed on pregnant
women who use illicit drugs, alcohol, or otherwise behave in
"unauthorized" 1 8 ways. In this context, physicians often act as state agents
because they are encouraged and sometimes required to report women's
"unauthorized" behavior to a state agency.19 The state then seeks to
"protect" the fetus from the unauthorized and unwise behavior of its mother
in a variety of ways, including taking the pregnant woman into custody to
ensure her "proper" or state-sanctioned behavior.
Court rulings and statutes that purport to protect fetuses are
obviously hostile to women. They are designed to punish women who do
not conform to our society's conception of women or our understanding of
the good and proper mother. These women are deemed irresponsible or evil
because they refuse to or are unable to comply with society's expectations
17 Another constitutional argument is that the detention, confinement, and
incarceration of women who behave in deleterious ways to their fetuses due to religious
decision making presents a violation of their free exercise rights. This First Amendment
issue is not addressed in this article as I have previously addressed it at length. See Cherry,
Free Exercise Rights, supra note 8, at 566-67.
18 In this context, unauthorized behavior means any behavior that the healthcare
provider or the state (through legislation and/or regulation) has delineated as harmful or
potentially harmful to the fetus.
19 For example, a current Wisconsin statute permits physicians and other health
care professionals to violate their pregnant patients' confidentiality in order to report
suspected drug or alcohol use to state authorities. See Wis. STAT. § 905.04(4)(e)(3) (2005).
The author made a similar argument with respect to the use of physicians as state agents and
its detrimental effect on pregnant women. See Cherry, Free Exercise Rights, supra note 8, at
619 (discussing physicians as state agents in the context of compelled medical treatment).
[Vol. 16:1
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regarding their behavior, leading them to be subject to public censure. 20
New York Times columnist Bob Herbert notes:
[T]hese laws are hostile to women. [They] are designed to punish
them and thrust them into perverse conflicts with their own
bodies, [and] are light years away from the best solutions.
Alcoholism and drug addiction are illnesses. But the fetal
protection movement has not been accompanied by any serious
effort to provide women with the alcohol and drug treatment that
they need or even, for that matter, adequate prenatal care. That is
not part of the agenda. 21
Pregnant women who use or abuse drugs are not part of the agenda; they are
seen to have violated the basic social belief that good mothers are self-
sacrificing. A pregnant woman who uses drugs is "viewed as self-indulgent,
placing her desire to get 'high' ahead of the need of her offspring to be bom
healthy," 22 and hence deserves contempt and punishment.
Although the experiences of pregnant women who are incarcerated
are probably more demeaning than the experiences of women detained in
other settings, these experiences highlight the punitive and demeaning
nature of detention. In a 1999 publication, Amnesty International reported
on several cases where incarcerated women were transported to the hospital
in shackles and forced to labor and give birth while chained to a hospital
bed. 3 These highlighted cases are not out of the ordinary. In fact, as of
1999, only fifteen states banned restraining pregnant women during labor.24
Furthermore, attorney Barrie Becker observes that "judges falsely believe
that jails and prisons provide better health care for the woman and the fetus
than the care an addicted woman would obtain on her own. 25 This belief is
2 0 See generally GOMEZ, supra note 6.
2 1 Bob Herbert, Fetal Protection Conceals Real Agenda, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL
SENTINEL, June 16, 1998, at 12, available at 1998 WLNR 3044594 at *1.
22 JEAN REITH SCHROEDEL, IS THE FETUS A PERSON? A COMPARISON OF POLICIES
ACROSS THE FIFTY STATES 103 (2002).
23 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE: VIOLATIONS OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RIGHTS FOR ALL
(1999), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engAMR5 10011999.
24 Id.
25 Barrie L. Becker, Note, Order in the Court: Challenging Judges Who
Incarcerate Pregnant, Substance-Dependent Defendants to Protect Fetal Health, 19
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 235, 237.
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prevalent even though considerable research concludes that the reason that
drug-addicted pregnant women "do not receive the care they need is not
lack of incentive on their part; rather, there is a severe shortage of drug
treatment programs which will accept pregnant women and provide prenatal
and drug treatment services which address their unique needs. 26
While the punitive nature of these detentions and confinements and
the harms they cause to women may be obvious, their negative effect on
fetuses, although less apparent, is nevertheless very real. Detentions and
confinements result in fetal harm in. two ways: by decreasing access to
prenatal care and by subjecting the fetus to harmful conditions inside of the
prison itself.27 Women who use drugs or refuse medical treatment do not
access prenatal care for fear of being punished. Because prenatal care,
including maternal nutrition, is paramount in ensuring the health of the
fetus, decreased access to prenatal care results in poor fetal outcomes.2 s
Indeed, the nation's leading medical associations, including the American
Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the
American Public Health Association, have all opposed punitive measures
against pregnant women who use drugs. Their opposition is due in part to
their understanding that such measures will deter women from accessing
much needed prenatal care and that the absence of such care certainly will
have deleterious consequences for both maternal and fetal health.29
Likewise, prison detentions are extremely deleterious to fetal
health. The vast majority of prisons provide little or no prenatal care and no
26 Id. at 239-40.
27 See San Durrenberger, Solution Lies in Help, Not Jail, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, May
21, 2004, at 4 (arguing that the incarceration of pregnant women to treat health problems is
not in the best interest of fetuses or their mothers).
28 American Medical Association Board of Trustees, Legal Interventions During
Pregnancy, 264 J. AM. MED. ASS'N. 2663, 2667 (1990); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS: A GENERATION AT RISK (1990), available at http://www.gao.gov/
cgi-bm/ getrpt?HRD-90-138.
29 See American Medical Association Board of Trustees, supra note 28, at 2667;
Committee on Substance Abuse, American Academy of Pediatrics, Drug Exposed Infants,
96 PEDIATRICS 364, 366-67 (1995) (This article champions rehabilitation and stresses the use
of education and research to combat in-pregnancy drug use: "Punitive measures taken
toward pregnant women, such as criminal prosecution and incarceration, have no proven
benefits for infant health .... "); American Public Health Association, Public Policy
Statement No. 9020, Illicit Drug Use by Pregnant Women, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 253, 253
(1991) (recommending "that no punitive action be taken against pregnant women who are
users of illegal drugs when no other illegal acts ... have been committed").
[Vol. 16:1
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staff training regarding the needs of pregnant women. 30 Moreover, prison
conditions such as overcrowding, poor nutrition, and exposure to
contagious diseases present a considerable danger to the health of the
fetus. 3' In fact, the pregnancies of women who are incarcerated are much
more likely to end in miscarriage than those of women in general.32 Studies
have found that pregnant drug addicts in prison are more likely than non-
incarcerated pregnant drug addicts to have miscarriages and to give birth to
children with abnormalities. 33 Finally, incarcerated addicts often have
access to illegal drugs as illegal drugs continue to be readily available in
prison.34 When judges and legislators turn their attention to the perceived
fetal health problems resulting from behaviors such as the drug or alcohol
use of pregnant women, they undertake to "protect" the fetus from its
mother. These protective measures have included taking the pregnant
woman into state custody in an attempt to ensure that her behavior will not
deleteriously affect the fetus. Underlying state detention is a legal culture
that seems to prefer the real or imagined needs of the fetus over and above
the constitutional interests of the pregnant woman. The following sections
discuss the effects of American drug and alcohol policy on pregnant women
and the constitutional interests of pregnant women in avoiding detention or
confinement for the perceived sake of the fetus.
30 See John C. Coughenour, Separate and Unequal: Women in the Federal
Criminal Justice System, 8 FED. SENT. R. 142, 143 (1995), available at 1995 WL 862005, at
3 (federal prisons are ill equipped to care for pregnant women; inadequate prenatal and
obstetric care are available); John Pacenti, Prenatal Care at Jail Criticized, PALM BEACH
POST, May 9, 2004, at IC; Ellen Barry, Pregnant Prisoners, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 189
(1989); see also Robert T. Downs, The Right to Procreate While Incarcerated: A Look at the
'Obvious' Differences Between Male and Female Inmates, 12 S. CAL. REV. L & WOMEN'S
STUD. 67, 100 (2002) (the needs of pregnant inmates are typically neglected by prisons that
are already inadequate to provide medical care); Deborah J. Krauss, Note, Regulating
Women's Bodies: The Adverse Effect of Fetal Rights Theory on Childbirth Decisions and
Women of Color, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 523, 537 (1991).
31 Krauss, supra note 30, at 537; Alan Eisner, Supermax Prison: A Growing
Human Rights Problem, 28 CHAMPION 36, 43 (2004) (noting that in most state prisons,
pregnant women get the same food as other inmates).
32 Jean Reith Schroedel & Paul Pertz, A Gender Analysis of Policy Formation: The
Case of Fetal Abuse, 19 J. HEALTH POL'Y & L. 335, 350-51 (1994).
33 See, e.g., SCHROEDEL, supra note 22, at 105 (citations omitted).
34 See Andrew H. Malcolm, Explosive Drug Use Creating New Underworld in
Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1989, § 1, at 1; see also BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE
BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF EMBRYOS & FETUSES 141 (1992) (noting the ease
of obtaining illicit drugs in prison and the lack of prison prenatal care).
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A. The Effects of Drug and Alcohol Policy on the Detention of Pregnant
Women
Many of the detentions of pregnant women for the purported
benefit of the fetus are predicated on the woman's drug or alcohol use.
Although the courts have long understood those dependent on drugs or
alcohol as diseased and deserving of treatment, 35 courts have not treated
pregnant women who are alcohol- or drug-dependent in the same regard. As
one commentator noted, "it is an addicted woman who becomes pregnant,
not a pregnant woman who becomes addicted., 36 Nevertheless, alcohol- and
drug-dependent pregnant women have been increasingly subject to criminal
and civil penalties arising out of their dual status as pregnant and substance-
dependent. In the name of fetal health, authorities penalize women in order
to protect fetuses from the unwise behavior of their mothers.
Undeniably some fetuses are harmed by in utero exposure to
alcohol, illicit drugs, and other lawful substances. Newborns born to drug-
dependent women can suffer from a host of medical, developmental, and
behavioral problems.37 However, not all children born to women who used
illicit drugs during their pregnancies are permanently affected by that
exposure.38 Not only is the presence and severity of these problems
dependent upon the nature of their mother's drug use, 39 the scientific
evidence demonstrating the link is itself uncertain.4 ° Medical evidence
35 See, e.g., Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (recognizing drug
addiction as a disease); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (deeming
punishment for the status of being addicted cruel and unusual punishment, impermissible
under the Eighth Amendment); Huff v. State, 568 P.2d 1014, 1017 (Alaska 1977)
(recognizing persons addicted to narcotics are diseased and proper subjects for medical
treatment).
36 Kathryn T. Jones, Prenatal Substance Abuse: Oregon's Progressive Approach
to Treatment and Child Protection Can Support Children, Women, and Families, 35
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 797 (1999).
37 Victoria J. Swenson & Cheryl Crabbe, Pregnant Substance Abusers: A Problem
That Won't Go Away, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 623, 626 (1994).
38 Id. at 627.
39 Id. at 628.
40 Kenneth A. De Ville & Loretta M. Kopelman, Fetal Protection in Wisconsin 's
Revised Child Abuse Law: Right Goal, Wrong Remedy, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 332, 336
(1999) [hereinafter De Ville & Kopelman, Right Goal, Wrong Remedy]; see also Kenneth A.
De Ville and Loretta Kopelman, Moral and Social Issues Regarding Pregnant Women Who
[Vol. 16:1
HeinOnline  -- 16 Colum. J. Gender & L. 156 2007
Incarceration of Pregnant Women
regarding the harmful effect of alcohol on a developing fetus is much better
understood. Alcohol is a teratogen, an agent that causes malformation of the
developing embryo.4' Maternal alcohol consumption can result in mental
retardation and other physical and mental handicaps in the resulting child.
42
But again, the severity of these problems is dependent on the nature of their
mother's alcohol consumption.4 ' Because the effects of alcohol and drug
abuse on the fetus can vary widely, the state's actions regarding pregnant
abusers are difficult to justify on the basis of scientific evidence.
Although there may be other possible solutions, many jurisdictions
have invoked the criminal law to address the difficulties that result from
maternal drug and alcohol use. For example, as of 1999, more than 200
women who were pregnant or who had recently given birth had been
arrested for the avowed benefit of fetal rights and fetal health.44
Furthermore, as Lynn Paltrow, Executive Director of the non-profit
National Advocates for Pregnant Women, has reported, the vast majority of
these women are "low-income women of color with untreated drug
addictions. ' 5 These prosecutions have taken a particularly oppressive turn
in South Carolina where the legislature declared, and the state supreme
court concurred, that viable fetuses are children. Consequently, South
Use and Abuse Drugs, 25 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY CLINIC OF NORTH AMERICA 237,
237-54 (1998) [hereinafter De Ville & Kopelman, Moral and Social Issues]; GOMEZ, supra
note 6.
Initial Studies by Dr. Ira Chasnoff and his colleagues suggested a correlation
between the use of cocaine during pregnancy and instances of premature birth, low birth
weight, and higher rates of physical, mental, and emotional problems. See Ira J. Chasnoff et
al., Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 666 (1985). These claims have been
refuted by many other scientists. See, e.g., Nancy L. Day & Gale A. Richardson,
Comparative Teratogenicity of Alcohol and Other Drugs, 18 ALCOHOL RES. WORLD 42
(1994).
41 See Claire E. Dineen, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome: The Legal and Social Responses
to Its Impact on Native Americans, 70 N.D. L. REV. 1, 18 (1994).
42 Id. at 4 ("Fetal alcohol syndrome (or FAS) is the name given to a pattern of
major and minor physical malformations, growth deficiencies, and central nervous system
abnormalities caused by maternal alcohol use during pregnancy. FAS is well defined for the
children most severely affected by prenatal alcohol exposure." Fetal alcohol effects or FAE
is a milder or more subtle form of FAS.).
4 1Id. at 18.
44 Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v.
Wade, 62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1001 (1999).
45 Id.
2007]
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Carolina's criminal child abuse and neglect and homicide statutes apply to
any actions or activity of pregnant women that may result in fetal harm or
fetal death.46 Nor have the issues addressed by the criminal law been limited
to drug and alcohol dependency. Pregnant women who simply refused to
act as their physicians suggested or as the state agency thought appropriate
have been subject to criminal sanction.47 In addition to criminal approaches,
many jurisdictions use child protection statutes to justify removal of
alcohol- and drug-affected infants from their mothers directly after birth. As
of 1999, twelve states required physicians to report drug use by pregnant
women to state child welfare agencies.48
Unlike the use of criminal law, direct court intervention requiring
the detention of pregnant women is less often noted and discussed.
Intervention has included court orders that confine pregnant women to
hospitals, sometimes for particular medical procedures, or in prisons for the
duration of their pregnancies based on their unwillingness or inability to
46 Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1995), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1145 (1998) (holding that behavior by pregnant woman that might endanger her fetus,
including illegal drug use, is actionable under the state criminal child neglect statute and
punishable by ten years in prison); State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 819 (2003) (woman who used crack cocaine sporadically during her
pregnancy convicted of homicide by child abuse after delivering a stillborn child). A similar
trend has been seen in Hawaii. See, e.g., State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210 (Haw. 2005)
(reversing conviction of manslaughter for woman convicted of causing the death of her
newborn as a result of smoking methampetamine); Editorial, Reversal in Aiwohi Case Makes
Sense, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, July 8, 2005, at 18A (Aiwohi pled no contest to
manslaughter in connection with the death of newborn and was sentenced to ten years
probation on the theory that her methamphetamine use poisoned her infant in utero and
caused its death.).
47 See GOMEZ, supra note 6, at 42-46 (discussing the prosecution of Pamela Rae
Stewart in San Diego, California).
48 Indeed the most common legal action against women who use drugs or alcohol
during their pregnancies is the use of child abuse and neglect statutes to remove newborns
from their mothers as a result of a positive toxicology screen taken shortly after birth. See,
e.g., Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of
Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 519-25 (1992). Although this
approach is popular with legislatures and district attorney offices, scientists and doctors warn
that the "stigmatizing terms" used in the criminal law and by child protective agencies "not
only lack scientific validity" but also "harm[] the children to which they are applied by ...
leading to policies that ignore factors including poverty, that play a much more significant
role in their lives." Press Release, Top Medical Doctors, Scientists & Specialist Urge Major
Medial Outlests Not to Create "Meth Baby" Myth (July 27, 2005) (on file with author) (press
release sent to CBS National News, Minneapolis Star Tribune, New York Times and others
from more than 90 doctors and scientists).
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comply with behavior that a state official or physician believes is important
for the health of their fetuses. The relevant jurisdictions have taken three
approaches. Some courts have used either parens patriae or child welfare
statutes to take custody of a fetus the court views as endangered by its
mother's behavior. Other courts have used their power in criminal
proceedings to incarcerate pregnant women found guilty of minor crimes
who have been discovered using alcohol or illicit drugs while pregnant. In
these cases, women are incarcerated for the sole purpose of "protecting"
their fetuses. Finally, some state legislatures have been directly involved. In
at least three instances, state legislatures have passed statutes that permit the
state to civilly commit pregnant women who use drugs or alcohol. 49 All of
these solutions to the perceived problem of maternal non-compliance force
forms of state mandated pregnancy and motherhood. Those who do not
comply with these mandates are subject to penalty, censure, and most
importantly loss of liberty and decision making power.
In the remainder of this section, this Article outlines and analyzes
the three ways in which states have taken pregnant women into custody in
order to protect fetal health without fully considering the legal interests of
the pregnant woman that are at stake. These methods include: (1) the use of
the court's parens patriae power, including judicial interpretation of child
neglect and abuse statutes to include the protection of fetuses; (2) the use of
civil commitment statutes to confine pregnant women in hospitals; and
finally (3) the use of incarceration during the pregnancy as a way to ensure
maternal compliance.50 Underlying all of these methods of detention is the
prioritization of fetal life and fetal health over the constitutional liberty
interests of the pregnant woman and the development of a state-sanctioned
form of mothering.
49 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.05 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
626.5561(1)-(2) (West 2005) (permitting emergency commitment of pregnant woman who
have used a controlled substance); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-20A-63 (allowing
pregnant women who use alcohol or drugs to be involuntarily committed to a treatment
facility); WIS. STAT. §§ 48.133, 48.193, 48.213(l)(b) (2005) (establishing procedures for
taking a pregnant woman into custody when fetus is in need of protection or services).
50 This ultimate method (incarceration) ensures neither maternal compliance nor
fetal health. See April Cherry, Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, The Social Construction of
Maternal Deviance, and Some Thoughts About Love and Justice, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 245,
253 (1999).
20071
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B. Use of Parens Patriae Power and Child Protection Statutes to Detain
Pregnant Women
Courts have used civil law remedies to take pregnant women into
state custody and to compel state-sanctioned maternal behavior deemed
necessary for the health or life of fetuses. In some instances, courts have
relied upon their common law parens patriae powers to permit the states'
"limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's
welfare., 51 In other instances, courts have relied upon statutory provisions
in the state's child welfare law to take custody of the fetus, asserting that
the legislative intent of the statute was to include a viable fetus within the
statutory definition of "child.,
52
1. The Case of Compelled Medical Treatment
In compelled medical treatment cases, a court compels non-
consensual medical treatment deemed necessary by a physician on a
pregnant woman. In many cases, the state takes custody of the fetus under
its parens patriae powers in order to compel the treatment.5 3 As I have
noted elsewhere, many of these cases involve a pregnant woman's religious
objection to treatment.54 Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County is one such
case. 55 Jefferson involved a pregnant woman who refused to consent to
cesarean section surgery on religious grounds, even though the hospital
physician predicted that her fetus would surely die and that she would likely
die without surgery.56 The trial court ordered the cesarean section surgery
based on its finding that "as a matter of law ... this child is a viable human
being and entitled to the protection of the Juvenile Court Code of
Georgia., 57 The trial court also concluded that Jefferson's fetus was a child
51 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944); see also In re E.G., 549
N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1989) (finding that the parens patriae power was greatest when health
care issues are potentially life threatening).
52 Wisconsin ex rel. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 732 (Wis. 1997).
53 See Cherry, Free Exercise Rights, supra note 8, at 596-99, 603-08, for a fuller
discussion of this issue.
54 Id.
55 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
56 Id. at 459.
[Vol. 16:1
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"without the proper parental care and subsistence necessary for his or her
physical life and health., 58 For that reason, the court granted temporary
custody of the fetus to the state's child welfare agency, authorizing it "to
make all decisions, including giving consent to the surgical delivery
appertaining to the birth of this child."59 Mrs. Jefferson filed a motion to
stay the trial court's decision which the Supreme Court of Georgia denied
summarily, citing, inter alia, the United States Supreme Court decision in
Roe v. Wade.60
The District of Columbia Superior Court has also compelled at least
one cesarean section surgery by taking custody of a fetus under the state's
parens patriae power. In In re Madyun, the court compared the fetus to a
child and asserted its parens patriae power to both detain Ms. Madyun at
the hospital and to impose the non-consensual surgery over her religious
objections. The court stated that its order was made to protect the state's
interest in the viable fetus.6 1
New York State trial courts have also taken custody of fetuses and
their mothers by asserting the state's parens patriae power. For example, in
In re Jamaica Hospital, the trial court asserted that the state's significant
interest in a non-viable, eighteen-week-old fetus outweighed the mother's
right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment on religious grounds.62 The
court exercised its parens patriae power to appoint a special guardian for
the fetus and to allow the guardian to order a blood transfusion for the
mother, a Jehovah's Witness.63 The court recognized that the eighteen-
58 1d
59 Id. The trial court further stated that the "intrusion ... into the life of [Mrs.]
Jefferson and her husband ... [was] outweighed by the duty of the State to protect a living,
unborn human being from meeting his or her death before being given the opportunity to
live." Id. at 460.
60 Id. See also Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, 66 F.
Supp. 2d 1247, 1250 (N.D. Fla. 1999) which reached a result similar to that in the Jefferson
case but did not involve a religious objection. In Pemberton, the pregnant woman at issue
was returned to the hospital by county sheriffs deputies as ordered by the state court after
having left the hospital in order to avoid an unwanted cesarean section.
61 In re Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. Law Rptr. 2233, 2240 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986);
see also In re Steven S., 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (pregnant woman detained
in mental health hospital after trial court determines that her fetus is a "dependent child"
under California child protection statutes, dismissed on appeal as moot).
62 In re Jamaica Hospital, 491 N.Y.S. 2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
63 491 N.Y.S. 2d at 899-900. The fetus at issue was only eighteen weeks old and in
no way viable. Id.
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week-old fetus was not yet viable and, therefore, concluded that the state's
interest was not "compelling," as defined by Roe.64 Despite this realization,
the court held that "in the context of abortion .... the state has a significant
interest in protecting the potential of human life represented by an unborn
fetus. 65 Moreover, the court in In re Jamaica likened the fetus to a child66
and asserted its parens patriae jurisdiction to appoint a physician as
guardian to the fetus.67 The guardian was given the authority "to do all that
in his medical judgment was necessary to save [the fetus's] life, including
the transfusion of blood into the mother."
68
2. The Detention of Drug-Dependent Pregnant Women and The
"Protective Custody" of Their Fetuses
Wisconsin ex rel. Angela v. Kruzicki69 is another example of how
courts have used their power to take custody of a fetus in utero, thereby
necessitating custody of the pregnant woman. The Kruzicki court based its
detention of the pregnant woman on its statutory jurisdiction allowing it to
detain and protect children in need of supervision. y
In some ways, the facts of Kruzicki are similar to the facts found in
Jefferson, In re Jamaica Hospital, and In re Madyun. In each of these
instances, court proceedings were initiated by the reports of physicians who
believed that the women were putting their fetuses at risks due to the
choices they were making. The choice in Kruzicki, however, did not involve
64 Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973)).
65 Id. at 899 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 900. "For the purposes of this proceeding, therefore, the fetus can be
regarded as a human being, to whom the court stands in parens patriae, and to whom the
court has an obligation to protect." Id. at 899.
67 Id. at 900; see also Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical
Center, 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1250 (N.D. Fla. 1999).
68 In re Jamaica Hospital, 491 N.Y.S. 2d 898, 900 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1985).
69 541 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), overruled by Wisconsin ex rel. Angela v.
Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1997) (on statutory grounds). Several law review
commentators have written specifically about the Kruzicki case, see e.g., De Ville &
Kopelman, Right Goal, Wrong Remedy, supra note 40; Carol Gosain, Casenote, Protective
Custody for Fetuses: A Solution to the Problem of Maternal Drug Use? Casenote on
Wisconsin ex rel. Angela v. Kruzicki, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 799 (1997).
7 Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729; see, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.19(l)(c), 48.13(10).
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a refusal to consent to a surgery necessary to preserve the life of her fetus;
rather, Kruzicki's physician found that she tested positive for cocaine.7' Her
physician reported the positive findings to the County Department of Health
and Human Services. The Department petitioned the juvenile court and
requested an order to remove "the above-named unborn child from his or
her present custody, and [to] plac[e] the unborn child in protective
custody," because the fetus was a "child in need of protection or services"
under the state's child welfare statutes. 72 The petition was supported by an
affidavit of the pregnant woman's physician, who stated that "without
intervention forcing [the pregnant woman] to cease her drug use," her fetus
would suffer serious physical harm.73 The juvenile court issued the
requested order stating that, "the unborn child ... be detained ... by the
Waukesha County Sheriffs Department and transported to Waukesha
Hospital for inpatient treatment and protection. Such detention will by
necessity result in the detention of the unborn child's mother., 74 This order
was upheld by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held
that a viable fetus is a "child" within the meaning of the child welfare
statute, and that the application of the statute did not violate the pregnant
woman's substantive due process rights because the statute was narrowly
tailored to vindicate the state's compelling interest in the health, safety, and
welfare of a viable fetus.75 However, the juvenile court's order was
overturned by the Wisconsin Supreme Court on statutory grounds.76
Unlike the courts below, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
the statute used to detain the pregnant woman did not give the court
jurisdiction over the viable fetus or its mother.77 As a result, the Wisconsin
high court did not reach the federal constitutional substantive due process
issues raised by the state's detention of the defendant. The court stated:
"Because we conclude that the legislature did not intend to equate a fetus
71 Kruzicki, 541 N.W. 2d at 485.
72 Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d at 732.
73 Id.
74 Id. (interpreting § 48 of the Wisconsin Statute, the juvenile court order was later
revised on appeal to reflect the supreme court's decision that a fetus is not a "child" within
the meaning of the state's child welfare statute).
71 Kruzicki, 541 N.W. 2d at 493.
76 Kruzicki, 561 N.W. 2d at 729.
77 id.
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with a child, we do not reach the question answered by the court of
appeals. 78 Ultimately, the Wisconsin legislature amended the statute to
clearly include viable fetuses in its definition of "child" under the Children
in Need of Protective Services ("CHIPS") statute, 9 thereby allowing for
pregnant women to be detained in the name of fetal health in future cases.
C. Civil Commitment Statutes as a Tool of Compliance
An increasing number of state legislatures have amended their civil
commitment statutes to permit the detention of pregnant women who abuse
drugs or alcohol or otherwise are believed to endanger their fetuses. The
civil commitment statutes of Wisconsin, South Dakota, and Minnesota are
three examples of this approach.
1. Wisconsin's Legislative Response to Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki
As noted above, the Wisconsin statute promulgated in 1997 in
response to the state supreme court's holding in State of Wisconsin ex rel
Angela M W. v. Kruzicki was the first state statute permitting the civil
commitment of a pregnant woman for the sake of the health of her fetus.
The asserted purpose of the statute is
[t]o recognize that unborn children have certain basic needs
which must be provided for, including the need to develop
physically to their potential and the need to be free from physical
harm due to the habitual lack of self-control of their expectant
mothers in the use of alcoholic beverages, controlled substances,
or controlled substance analogs .... 80
7 Id. at 739.
79 WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.01- 48.998 (West 2006). The Court of Appeals of
Oregon has interpreted its civil commitment statute to allow for the commitment of pregnant
women whose behavior poses specific threats to their fetuses. See Oregon v. Ayala, 991 P.2d
1100, 1103-04 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). Although the court held that the commitment order was
premised on the pregnant woman's inability to care for her gestational diabetes and thereby
harming her fetus was void as not based on clear and convincing evidence, the court seems
to assume that had such evidence been part of the record, the commitment of Ms. Ayala for
not complying with her physician's instructions during her pregnancy could legally or
constitutionally result in her commitment under the state civil commitment statute. Id.
80 WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.01 (1) (am), 48.133 (2005).
[Vol. 16:1
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The legislature's .objective thus elevates the purported needs of the
fetus over the needs and decisional autonomy of the pregnant woman.
Consequently, the statute allows the state to intervene in any woman's
pregnancy in order to protect the fetus from any potentially serious harm
that could be caused by habitual maternal ingestion of drugs or alcohol. 1
In addition to the arguably unconstitutional restriction of pregnant
women's liberty, the statute suffers from numerous other flaws. For
example, the statute allows police officers to "take a pregnant woman into
custody if he or she believes that the woman's use of alcohol is posing a
substantial risk to the physical health of the child. 82 Any determination that
a woman had violated the statute would necessarily be speculative since
scientific research in this area is inconclusive; not all pregnant mothers who
drink alcohol or consume illicit drugs will bear children with injuries.83 Nor
are those who are injured by their mother's prenatal alcohol or drug use
injured in the same manner or to the same extent. 4 As a result, any
commitment made pursuant to the statute is based not on the ordinary
standard of clear and convincing evidence of harm, but rather on
inconclusive scientific research and often speculative beliefs regarding
harm to the fetus.85 Moreover, because the statute protects an "unborn
81 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.02(l)(am) (2005). "Serious physical harm inflicted on the
unborn child, and the risk of serious physical harm to the child when born, caused by the
habitual lack of self control of the expectant mother of the unborn child in the use of alcohol
beverages, controlled substances or controlled substance analogs, exhibited to a severe
degree." Id. Kenneth DeVille and Loretta Kopelman have written an interesting analysis of
the Wisconsin statute and how the use of "expectant mother" and "unborn child" instead of
"pregnant woman" and "fetus" in the statutory language blur any differences between
children and fetuses and refuse to see a woman as an individual possessed of rights. DeVille
& Kopelman, Right Goal, Wrong Remedy, supra note 40, at 334. The language also
"reflect[s] the underlying ideology that inspired the law and ha[s] a practical impact on how
the policy is implemented." Id. at 334.
82 Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, supra note 44, at 1048 (summarizing WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 48.193(1)(d)(2) (2005)).
83 See, e.g., Nancy L. Day & Gale A. Richardson, supra note 40 (comparing effects
of in-pregnancy alcohol, marijuana, cocaine and crack, tobacco, and other drug use on
children; effects of alcohol use are highly predictable; research on the effects of other drugs
varies and is inconclusive).
84 Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, supra note 44, at 305; De Ville and Kopelman,
Right Goal, Wrong Remedy, supra note 40, at 335-36 & nn.44-55; see e.g., D.R. Neuspiel,
Cocaine and the Fetus: Mythology of Severe Risk, 15 NEUROTOXICOLOGY AND TERATOLOGY
305-06 (1993); GOMEZ, supra note 6, at 89.
85 De Ville and Kopelman, Right Goal, Wrong Remedy, supra note 40, at 336.
Therefore, as De Ville and Kopelman note, "it may be difficult, if not impossible to establish
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child," defined therein as a "human being from the time of fertilization to
the time of birth," all pregnant women would be subject to the statute
regardless of fetal viability. 86 Accordingly, the statute may force any
pregnant woman, at any stage of pregnancy, to choose between civil
commitment and abortion in some circumstances. Compounding the
problematic nature of the statute on its face, is the fact that the statute went
into effect without any interpretive guidelines. 87 This lack of guidelines
works to deny both law enforcement and the court any assistance as to how
they might enforce the statute without running afoul of these difficulties.
Given the inconclusive scientific research, courts may be basing
their determination of fetal harm on something even more problematic: their
perception of the proper behavior of pregnant women. 88 Hence any pregnant
woman who does not comply with her physician's instructions or the
court's expectations regarding appropriate behavior may be subject to the
Wisconsin child abuse and neglect statute and may be confined or
committed for the duration of her pregnancy. 89 If her child is born with
injuries sustained in utero because of alcohol or drug use, the mother may
also be subject to criminal child abuse and neglect prosecution, furthering
the coercive character of the Wisconsin statutory system and directly
implicating women's right to reproductive freedom.
90
The Wisconsin legislation goes further than empowering physicians
to report pregnant women who use drugs or alcohol to state authorities. The
statute empowers physicians and other health care providers, including
social workers and counselors, to report a pregnant woman to authorities if
a clearly defined threshold beyond which the risk to the resulting child will justify, as a
matter of standing policy, coercive intervention or criminal prosecution." Id. at 336.
Furthermore, De Ville and Kopelman argue that the "scientific evidence is sufficient to
counsel women against substance use and abuse and to provide treatment services to those
women who want to forgo those substances during their pregnancies. But given the current
levels of knowledge regarding substance abuse and fetal harm, the risk of fetal injury will
rarely be sufficient to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard that is required when
the state wishes to deprive an individual of his/her liberty." Id. at 336.
86 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.02 (19) (West 2005).
87 id
88 See April L. Cherry, Nurturing in the Service of White Culture, 10 TEX. J. OF
WOMEN & L. 83, 116 (2001).
89 See also De Ville and Kopelman, Right Goal, Wrong Remedy, supra note 40, at
337.
90 See WIs. STAT. § 940.06 (2006).
HeinOnline  -- 16 Colum. J. Gender & L. 166 2007
2007] Incarceration of Pregnant Women 167
he "suspects" that the health of the fetus will be compromised by the
pregnant woman's drug or alcohol use. Section 146.0255(2) of the
Wisconsin Statutes states:
Any hospital employee who provides health care, social worker
or intake worker under chapter 48 may refer an infant or an
expectant mother of an unborn child ... to a physician for testing
of the bodily fluids of the infant or expectant mother for
controlled substances or controlled substance analogs if the
hospital employee . . . suspects that the infant or expectant
mother has controlled substances or controlled substance analogs
in the bodily fluids of the infant or expectant mother because of
the use of controlled substances or controlled substance analogs
by the mother while she was pregnant with the infant or by the
expectant mother while she is pregnant with the unborn child....
If the results of the test indicate that the infant does have
controlled substances or controlled substance analogs in the
infant's bodily fluids, the physician shall make a report .... If
the results of the test indicate that the expectant mother does have
controlled substances or controlled substance analogs in the
expectant mother's bodily fluids, the physician may make a
report.
91
Because the statute allows reporting by a large class of people, more
women are likely to be turned over to the authorities and, as a result,
confined under the statute.
Moreover, the Wisconsin legislation has far reaching implications
concerning the abortion rights and other civil rights of pregnant women.
Attorney and scholar Lynn Paltrow argues:
The revised Wisconsin code also permits counties to appoint
juvenile court commissioners to oversee cases and conduct
hearing applicable to unborn children, but only allows lawyers
with "a demonstrated interest in the welfare of ... unborn
children" to be eligible for appointment to such positions. . ..
Because unborn children are defined to exist from the moment of
fertilization, a guardian could be appointed even for pre-embryos.
... Consequently, if a woman decided to have an abortion during
the pendency of her case, the guardian would undoubtedly be
expected to oppose it in the "best interests" of the "unborn child."
91 WIS. STAT. § 146.0255(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
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Guardians are also required to "assess the appropriateness and
safety of the environment of the... "unborn child." The pregnant
woman is thus reduced, by statutory terms to an "environment"
for a fetus, or in other words, a fetal container.
92
Finally, the Wisconsin statute requires in some instances and allows
in others for physicians and other health care professions to disclose
confidential information about the pregnant woman without her consent
when "the examination of the expectant mother of an abused unborn child
creates a reasonable ground for an opinion ... that the physical injury
inflicted on the unborn child was caused by the habitual lack of self-control
of the expectant mother . . . in the use of alcohol beverages, controlled
substances or controlled substance analogs, exhibited to a severe degree.,
93
While the Wisconsin statute is flawed for all of the reasons discussed
above, an additional flaw concerns the harm the statute will cause to
fetuses. In fact, it may harm more fetuses than it helps because pregnant
women who would benefit from drug and alcohol counseling and services
will be reluctant to seek prenatal care because of their fears of being turned
over to state authorities.
2. Legislative Activity in South Dakota and Minnesota Permitting Civil
Commitment of Pregnant Women Who Use Alcohol or Illicit Drugs
In 1998, the South Dakota legislature enacted a statute that permits
the involuntary emergency civil commitment of pregnant women who
92 Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, supra note 44, at 1047 (citations omitted). As
New York Times columnist Bob Herbert has noted: "The passage of laws purporting to
protect fetuses by declaring them 'persons' is an accelerating national trend ... in the long
run, that would undermine a woman's right to have an abortion." Herbert, supra note 21,
available at 1998 WLNR 3044594 at * 1. Paltrow's concerns are not unfounded. Indeed, in at
least one other state, Alabama, some judges have begun to appoint guardians for fetuses in
cases involving judicial by-pass hearings for minors seeking abortions, thereby severely
limiting minors' access to abortion in that state. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497
(Ala. Civ. App. 1998); In re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); see also
Helena Silverstein, In the Matter of Anonymous, A Minor: Fetal Representation in Hearings
to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69 (2001) (arguing
that such appointments are likely to meet the "undue burden" standard, but that the standard
itself has become "undue" in states that recognize a strong interest in the unborn fetuses).
93 WIS. STAT. § 905.04(4)(e)(3) (2006); see also WIS. STAT. § 905.04(4)(f) (2006)
(allowing testing to be performed without consent of the pregnant woman).
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94abuse alcohol or drugs. The statute states that "[a]n intoxicated person
who... [i]s pregnant and abusing alcohol or drugs may be committed to an
approved treatment facility for emergency treatment."95 The statute further
provides that the court can place a pregnant woman in state custody for the
duration of her pregnancy if she is found to be abusing alcohol or drugs.
96
However, the statute fails to guide law enforcement officials or the judiciary
in defining "abusing alcohol or drugs. 97 Hence every law enforcement
officer and judge is left to determine, without any legislative guidance, how
much of an illicit drug or alcohol is too much. 98
In 1997, Minnesota enacted a similar statute permitting the
involuntary civil commitment of pregnant women who were dependent on
illegal drugs including cocaine, heroin, phencyclidine, methamphetamine,
or amphetamines, and whose "habitual and excessive use" endangered her
fetus. 99 Interestingly, the Minnesota statute does not include the use of
alcohol or marijuana, even though alcohol's tertagenic effects are well
known and marijuana use is illegal. 100 The Minnesota statute mandates that
health care providers report to state agencies or authorities if they "know[]
or ha[ve] reason to believe that a woman is pregnant and has used a
controlled substance for a non-medical purpose during the pregnancy." 10 1
Anyone else may also report a pregnant woman to state authorities for the
same reasons. 10 2 After someone makes a report, the local welfare agency
94 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34- 20A-63(3) (1998).
95 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20A-63 (1998) (referring to emergency
commitment-the statute does not discuss non-emergency commitment.).
96 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20A-63 to - 70 (1998).
97 Id.
98 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20A-63 (1998); see also Paltrow, Pregnant Users,
supra note 44, at 1049.
9 9 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 (2005).
100 SCHROEDEL, supra note 22, at 178.
101 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561, subdiv. I (West. Supp. 1999).
102 id.
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must "conduct an appropriate assessment and offer services indicated under
the circumstances."'
0 3
Interestingly, nothing in the Minnesota statute mandates that these
involuntarily confined women undergo drug treatment. The Center for
Policy Research notes that at least one pregnant woman who was
involuntarily committed under the statute was committed to a locked ward
for people with eating disorders for several months where she received no
treatment for her drug addiction.10 4 In addition, the statute empowers the
local welfare agency to seek an emergency confinement of the pregnant
woman if she refuses the "recommended voluntary services or fails
recommended treatment."' 5 By assessing confinement as a penalty for non-
compliance with "recommended" treatment, the legislature seems to
miscomprehend the very nature of a "recommendation." Thus, the services
under this model are neither recommended nor voluntary.
Rather, under this legislative model, services are mandatory if the
pregnant woman wishes to avoid confinement. Ultimately, through the
statute, the legislature has given physicians' recommendations the power of
law.'0 6 The legislature has obliterated the power of pregnant women to give
informed consent, even though informed consent is understood as an
important democratic good. Informed consent helps protect patients'
autonomy by shielding them from the undue influence of their physician's
personal values and preferences regarding treatment.'0 7 The statute's
resulting system works to deny these pregnant women basic rights to
autonomy, including the right to refuse medical treatment-a basic human
right and constitutional liberty.'
0 8
103 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561, subdiv. 2 ("Services offered may include, but
are not limited to, a referral for chemical dependency assessment, a referral for chemical
dependency treatment if recommended, and a referral for prenatal care.").
104 SCHROEDEL, supra note 22, at 178.
105 MFNN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561, subdiv. 2.
106 Similarly, in compelled medical treatment cases, judges give doctors'
recommendations the power of law and thereby destroy the foundation of informed consent.
See Cherry, Free Exercise Rights, supra note 8, at 590.
107 See J. Steven Svoboda et. al., Informed Consent for Neonatal Circumcision: An
Ethical and Legal Conundrum, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 61, 71-72 (2000).
108 See Cherry, Free Exercise Rights, supra note 8, at 589-93; April L. Cherry,
Roe's Legacy: The Non-Consensual Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women and
Implications for Female Citizenship, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 723, 736 (2004) [hereinafter
Cherry, Roe's Legacy]. As of 2002, fewer than 100 women have been involuntarily
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Rebecca Corneau's situation resembled Jessie Mae Jefferson's and
Angela M.W.'s. By refusing to comply with physician orders, Comeau
found herself detained in a state hospital. Comeau came to the attention of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as a member of the Attleboro-
Robidoux Sect, a fundamentalist Christian group which, like the better-
known and larger sect of Christian Scientists, rejects medical treatment.'0 9
The state believed that Comeau's rejection of medical treatment led to the
death of her newborn son, Jeremiah, in 1999.110 State officials asserted that
Jeremiah died because Comeau or other sect members who attended his
birth failed to aspirate his lungs after birth. Corneau refuted this claim and
insisted that Jeremiah was stillborn." Local authorities were also
concerned because they believed that another infant child in the sect died
during the same year as a consequence of being denied food. Eight
members of the sect were jailed for failing to cooperate in the state's
investigations into the two children's deaths. The state adjudicated Comeau
an unfit parent of her three living children and removed them from her
home.2 Notably, the state chose not to charge Corneau with any crime
relating to the death of Jeremiah or the other sect infant despite removing
her children. Nevertheless, when Corneau became pregnant in 2000, the
court ordered her to undergo a physical examination. Because her religion
prohibits medical treatment, Corneau refused to comply." 3 Consequently,
Corneau was held in contempt of court and the court ordered her to be
detained at a state-run medical facility for pregnant prison inmates. The
court stated that it feared for the health of the fetus if Comeau gave birth
committed to residential drug treatment facilities under this statute. SCHROEDEL, supra note
22, at 178. Political scientist Jean Reith Schroedel reports that the average stay is less than
one month. Id. (citing Judy Pasternak, Wisconsin Oks Civil Detention for Fetal Abuse, LA
TIMES, May 2, 1998, at Al).
109 Robin Power Morris, The Corneau Case, Futhering Trends of Fetal Rights and
Religious Freedom, 28 N.E.J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CON. 89, 92 (2002). For a fuller discussion of
the Corneau case, see Hedy Bower, How Far Can a State Go to Protect a Fetus? The
Rebecca Corneau Story, 31 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 123, 123 (2001).
110 Bower, How Far can a State Go, supra note 109, at 124.
... Id. at 123-24.
112 Dave Wedge, Hearing Slated on Cult Baby's Future, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 18,
2000, at 18.
113 Dave Wedge, Defiant Mom-Pregnant Cultist Refuses Medical Assistance,
BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 31, 2000, at 1.
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without medical assistance.' 14 The judge in the case reportedly stated to the
courtroom that the fetus had told him that it did not want to die. 115
D. The Incarceration of Drug Dependent Pregnant Women to Protect
Fetal Health
Incarceration is the third and perhaps most egregious mechanism by
which states have sought to protect fetal health from the imprudent behavior
of non-compliant pregnant women. United States v. Vaughn" 6 may be the
first publicized case of a sentencing judge incarcerating a pregnant
defendant solely to protect the health of her fetus. Brenda Vaughn was a
first time offender who pled guilty to second-degree theft-a
misdemeanor-for forging $700 worth of checks.1 17 Although the crime
was punishable by a fine of up to $1000 and one year in jail, the sentencing
judge noted that "most judges of this court would probably impose a
sentence of probation for most defendants with a first-time misdemeanor
conviction."', 18 Nevertheless, after determining that Vaughn tested positive
14 Dave Wedge, Judge Confines Cult Mom to Secure Hospital, Judge's Ruling
Locks up Defiant Pregnant Cult Mom, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 1, 2000, at 1; see also Morris,
The Corneau Case, supra note 109, at 94.
115 Mac Daniel, Judge Keeps Mother Confined Says Fetus Told Him '7 Do Not
Want to Die," BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8, 2000, at B6.
116 U.S. v. Vaughn, DAILY WASH. LAW REP., March 7, 1989, at 441 (D.C. Super.
Ct. Aug. 23, 1988) (Crim. No. F 2172-88 B (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 1988); see Richard
Cohen, When a Fetus Has More Rights than the Mother, WASH. POST, July 28, 1988, at A2 1;
Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Jailed Because She is Pregnant: A Superior Court Judge Went Beyond
His Duty, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1988, at C8. See also Becker, supra note 25, at 237
(discussing the Vaughn case and noting that judges in other jurisdictions "also use the
sentencing phase of a trial to punish drug use during pregnancy"); Id. at 237-38 (noting that
Indian tribal judges also use incarceration as a tool of fetal protection when dealing with
Native American women who live on reservations and drink alcohol while pregnant); Barrie
L. Becker & Peggy Hora, The Legal Community's Response to Drug Use During Pregnancy
in the Criminal Sentencing and Dependency Contexts: A Survey of Judges, Prosecuting
Attorneys, and Defense Attorneys in Ten California Counties, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 527, 530 (1993) (noting that, in a survey of judges at a course on alcohol and drugs
and the courts at the National Judicial College, all of the judges, save one, responded that
they would immediately remand the defendant into custody when asked what they would do
if a pregnant, long-time heroin user who tested positive for heroin came before them for a
probation violation on a drug case).
117 U.S. v. Vaughn, supra note 116, at 441.
' Id. at 447.
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for cocaine and was six months pregnant, the same Judge sentenced Vaughn
to six months incarceration." 9 He stated that he wanted "to be sure she
would not be released until her pregnancy was concluded ...because of
concern for the unborn child.' 20 The presiding judge believed that Ms.
Vaughn would not have access to illicit drugs in jail and that, as a result, the
fetus would suffer less harm. Moreover, the judge declared that such a
sentence was also in the best interest of "the taxpaying public who would
undoubtedly have to pay for . . . a child who could have severe and
expensive problems at birth."'
' 21
Incarceration of pregnant women for the perceived benefit of the
fetus continues to occur in trial courts. 22 New Jersey v. Ikerd 23 is one
recent example. Although the appellate court later overturned the decision,
Ikerd demonstrates the workings of trial courts, which, because much of
their work is unreported, are often shielded from public scrutiny and legal
academic analysis. Like in Vaughn, the court revoked the probation of a
drug addicted pregnant woman in Ikerd.124 Ikerd pled guilty to a third-
degree felony and was sentenced to five years probation. When she violated
her probation, she was eight weeks pregnant and addicted to drugs. At
sentencing, she was eleven weeks pregnant and sentenced to prison for the
duration of her pregnancy. The judge stated that he sentenced her to prison
for the duration of her pregnancy, "[n]ot because we want to punish her, but
because we want to save the baby."' 25 The trial transcripts further indicate
that the sole purpose of Ikerd's incarceration was to protect the health of her
" 91d at 441.
120 Id.; see also Rorie Surman, Keeping Baby Safe From Morn, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
3, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
121 U.S. v. Vaughn, supra note 116, at 441; see also STEINBOCK, supra note 34, at
140.
122 Another example of how the court uses threats of incarceration to control the
behavior of pregnant women can be found in the Second Judicial District of New Mexico in
Albuquerque. Under a court program, drug-using pregnant women who are arrested for non-
violent crimes can avoid prosecution by participating in a drug treatment and prenatal care
program coordinated by the court. For more detail, see GOMEZ, supra note 6, at 81.
123 850 A.2d 516 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
124 id.
125 Id. at 519. Moreover, the sentencing judge discussed the possibility of confining
Ikerd to a hospital for the duration of her pregnancy, but found that option unacceptable
because of its cost to taxpayers. Id.
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fetus. For example, the judge indicated that he would reconsider the
sentence when the baby was born or if Ikerd terminated her pregnancy. 26 In
addition, the trial judge told the defendant's attorney, "if she loses the baby,
if there is a problem, and she has the baby, I'll consider.., any application
that you wish to make at that time."'
127
Ikerd appealed her sentence on the grounds that her incarceration
was unlawful because it conflicted with both the sentencing statute and
constitutional guarantees.1 28 The appellate court rightly held that the
defendant had been incarcerated because she was a pregnant addict, not
because of the crime to which she had pled guilty; as such, her sentence was
unlawful. The appellate court stated:
The transcript of the February hearing clearly discloses that the
only reason that the judge sent Ikerd to prison was to protect the
health of her fetus, a consideration wholly unrelated to Ikerd's
underlying crime of welfare fraud. That the court was willing to
reconsider its sentence if Ikerd's pregnancy terminated
constitutes disturbing but compelling proof of this proposition.
ikerd was punished by being subject to the extended prison term
because she was pregnant and addicted, and for no other
129
reason.
The appellate court noted that the sentencing judge's decision in
this case implicated such constitutional issues as the protection against cruel
and unusual punishment, protection of the right to privacy, including the
right to procreation, and the due process and equal protection guarantees.
Yet, the appellate court did not base its decision on constitutional grounds.
Instead, it overturned Ikerd's sentence as a violation of state sentencing law
and a violation of the principles of separation of powers,130 holding that the
sentencing judge had in effect "usurped the powers of the legislature."' 3' In
126 Id. at 520.
127 id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 522 (emphasis added).
130 Id. at 523 (violates the statute which states that "no conduct constitutes an
offense unless the offense is defined by this code or another statute of this State") (citing
State v. Stewart, 642 A.2d 942 (N.J. 1994); State v. Cannon, 608 A.2d 341 (N.J. 1992)).
131 Id. at 523.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Colum. J. Gender & L. 174 2007
Incarceration of Pregnant Women
sum, the appellate court held that incarceration of a pregnant criminal
defendant for the sole purpose of protecting her fetus was impermissible
under the applicable state statutes, but only hinted that it may also violate a
number of constitutional principles.
In all of the cases discussed thus far, the pregnant women involved
behaved in "unauthorized" ways by either refusing to consent to medical
procedures recommended by physicians or by behaving in ways viewed as
at odds with the delivery of a healthy infant. Because they refused to
conform to mothering norms, they were subjected to censure and state
control without any regard for their own constitutional rights to privacy,
bodily integrity, and freedom from unwarranted detention and confinement.
II. FREEDOM FROM UNWARRANTED DETENTION AND THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The rights guaranteed by the Constitution protect the individual
from state intervention or coercion in a limited number of circumstances.
32
They are thought to be necessary to preserve individual liberty, a
prerequisite for democratic citizenship. 33 Such is the conventional
understanding of both the right to be free from detention or incarceration
without due process of law and the right to privacy related to reproductive
decisions. When the state detains pregnant women, not for the protection of
themselves but rather for the ostensible protection of their fetuses, the state
coerces those women to behave in ways that it believes would be beneficial
for their fetuses. This coercion represents a violation of two of the most
basic constitutional rights-the right to be free from unwarranted detention
and the right to privacy.
A. Freedom From Unwarranted Detention, Confinement and
Incarceration: The Right to be Free From Physical Restraint
Both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments maintain that the
state cannot deprive a citizen of liberty without due process of law. In its
simplest form, liberty in this context means freedom from incarceration or
detention by the state, or, in other words, "freedom from bodily
132 BREYER, supra note 7.
133 Id.
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restraint."' 34 This right of physical liberty-the right to be free from
physical restraint-is a fundamental right, and, as such, any restriction of
this right is subject to strict scrutiny. In order to restrict a citizen's physical
liberty, the state must show that such a restriction is the result of a
compelling state interest and that the restriction is the least restrictive means
of, or necessary for, protecting that state interest.
13 5
Recognition of the right to physical liberty permeates both the
criminal and civil law as demonstrated in the context of the use of
preventative detention by states to detain criminal defendants. Under the
doctrine of preventative detention, the state may hold or confine a criminal
defendant prior to trial without bail if it fears that the defendant is
dangerous to others.1 36 The state must articulate a compelling interest and
must show that no lesser restrictive alternatives are available or feasible. In
the preventative detention context, the protection of third parties is the
articulated compelling state interest. As the Court held in United States v.
Salerno, the government must present "an identified and articulable threat
to an individual or the community" for the detention to pass constitutional
muster.137 The state must also support its conclusion that the detention is
necessary for the protection of the third party by clear and convincing
evidence.38 Furthermore, "the judicial officer is not given unbridled
discretion in making the detention determination. Congress has specified
the considerations relevant to that decision. These factors include the nature
and seriousness of the charges, the sustainability of the Government's
evidence against the arrestee, the arrestee's background and characteristics,
and the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by the suspect's
release."'
139
Most of the pregnant women in the foregoing cases were not
criminal defendants. Therefore, preventative detention was inappropriate.
When the pregnant woman is a criminal defendant, preventative detention is
134 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
135 See, e.g., City of Bourne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1997) (holding that
when infringing upon a fundamental right, state has the burden of proving that the state
action is necessary to further a compelling state interest and that the action chosen represents
the least restrictive means of furthering the state interest).
136 75 A.L.R.3d 956.
137 U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987).
138 Id. at 742-43.
139 id.
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only appropriate if she poses a danger to a third party. Because the fetus is
not a legal person, 140 there is no support for considering the fetus a third
party, even if the fetus is viable. When the pregnant woman is convicted of
a crime and probation is ordered, to be constitutional the probation
conditions must relate either to her criminal conviction or to her future
criminality.' 4' If the state subjects a pregnant woman to conditions of
probation that bears no relationship to her convictions, then the conditions
are invalid and unconstitutional.
42
However, possibly with the hope of avoiding the issues related to
criminal detention, some courts have confined and detained pregnant
women for the preservation of fetal health through civil proceedings.
Nevertheless, because freedom from physical restraint is a fundamental
right, these civil courts must still overcome the highest of standards in order
to justify these restrictions.
In Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court articulated this strict
standard, holding that "civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection." ' 4 As
other commentators have noted, the state's interest in an individual's civil
commitment can be justified by two traditional state powers: the police
power and the parens patriae power. 44 The police power permits the state
to act to protect the community from a dangerous person, while the parens
patriae power permits the state to act to protect the individual from him or
herself. Both powers are limited. For example, in terms of civil
commitment, the police power cannot be used to protect the community
from all dangers. The parens patriae power is similarly restricted. It cannot
be used to protect the individual from all of his or her improvident acts. In
fact, parens patriae is traditionally used to protect children and only those
adults with mental disease or defects. When either state power is
140 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) ("The word 'person' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."). Also, born alive rules in criminal
and tort law require a live birth to support any claims on behalf of the child for injuries
incurred in utero. See, e.g., Ryan v. Brown, 827 N.E.2d 112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (claim
under Indiana Medical Malpractice Act was subject to summary judgment when the child
was not born alive, therefore barring the claim).
141 Becker & Hora, supra note 116, at 531; see generally, 21A AM. JUR. 2D
Criminal Law § 907.
142 Becker & Hora, supra note 116, at 532.
143 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979).
144 See, e.g., Gosain, supra note 69, at 828.
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implicated, the individual's physical liberty may be constrained, but only if
due process requirements have been met: the state must articulate a
compelling state interest and demonstrate that the detention is necessary for
the protection of that interest and that no less restrictive means exists to
protect that interest.
Like the commitment of the mentally ill, the detention of pregnant
women who use drugs or alcohol or who are otherwise non-compliant or
unconventional in the care of their fetus interferes with physical liberty. As
such, the detention must be subjected to strict scrutiny. In this context, the
state articulates a compelling interest based on both of the traditional
rationales: the parens patriae power to protect a pregnant woman from her
own behavior and the police power to protect third parties from the
pregnant woman's actions. In these cases, the court considers the fetus to be
the third party in need of protection. Thus, in order for a civil detention or
commitment to pass strict constitutional scrutiny, the state must show, by
clear and convincing evidence,'45 that the pregnant woman is either a danger
to herself or a danger to the fetus.
To invoke its parens patriae power, the state must show something
more than that the woman is a danger to herself The state must show that
the pregnant woman falls into the category of persons protected under the
parens patriae rationale. The making of poor choices does not generally
constitute mental disease or defect. While the pregnant woman's behavior
may be foolish or improvident, failure to abide by physicians' "orders" '46 or
continuing to drink alcohol or take illicit drugs arguably does not rise to the
level of mental disease and is consequently not subject to protection under
the parens patriae power.
To invoke the police power, the state must demonstrate a danger to
a third party. Thus, the state must show that the fetus constitutes a legally
recognized "other" at risk from injury because of the pregnant woman's
behavior. While the fetus may be at risk from the pregnant woman's poor or
unconventional choices, it cannot constitute a third party. The fetus is not
yet a legal person because it has no independent or legal existence outside
of its mother.'47 Some commentators argue that because the Court has held
4
'Addington, 441 U.S. at 432.
146 "Orders"-in the context of pregnant women, physician's recommendations are
not voluntary in that these detentions show that the pregnant woman must follow them or be
subject to censure. They are not recommendations in the sense that the woman, relying on
her on judgment, can decide not to abide by them -there is no sense in these determinations
that informed consent principles apply.
147 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
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that the state has a compelling interest in the fetus at viability'48 and that the
state has a "legitimate interest" in the fetus from the beginning of the
pregnancy,'49 the state may act to protect a viable fetus from the actions of
its improvident mother. 5° However, this argument fails to appreciate the
limits of the state's power; even when the state's interest in the fetus
becomes compelling, the state can only prevent the abortion of the fetus.' 5'
As such, the state's interest in the fetus is only compelling in the context of
abortion. The state cannot detain the pregnant woman to protect the fetus.
The state can only prevent the intentional destruction of the fetus; it cannot
prevent the unintended consequences of the pregnant woman's poor or
unconventional choices. Arguably, the Court has chosen to limit the state's
power because of the fundamental, constitutional importance of protecting
the woman's bodily integrity from state intrusion. Hence, the state's interest
in the fetus, non-viable or viable, is not compelling outside of the abortion
context. Therefore, the state cannot justify the detention of the pregnant
woman for the benefit of fetal health. 5
2
Assuming arguendo that the state could demonstrate the requisite
compelling interest, it must still establish that the confinement is necessary
to protect that interest. If less restrictive alternatives to detention exist,
detention becomes unconstitutional. Less restrictive alternatives are in fact
available for the protection or preservation of fetal health in the civil
context. These include, but are not limited to, state-provided drug and
alcohol rehabilitation for those who are interested, state-supported prenatal
care, and increased state-supported nutrition assistance programs. Indeed,
medical professionals assert that greater availability of alcohol and drug
treatment for pregnant women and increased access to prenatal care and
1481 Id. at 163-64.
149 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
150 See, e.g., Jason M. Steffens, Note, The "Peculiar" Being: The Rights of an
Unborn Child in Iowa, 88 IOWA L. REV 217, 256 (2002); Jeffrey P. Phelan, The Maternal
Abdominal Wall: A Fortress Against Fetal Health Care?, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, 479
(1991).
151 For a further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 161-162 and
accompanying text.
152 Interestingly, the state also has an interest in the health of the woman-an
interest in her rehabilitation. Such an interest may be enough to compel treatment in the case
of drug or alcohol addiction, but the state's interest is not strong enough to compel detention.
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good nutrition would lead to better fetal outcomes than any sort of
detention. '53
Because civil detention and commitment restricts an individual's
liberty, the state must demonstrate a compelling and necessary interest by
clear and convincing evidence and show that no less restrictive alternatives
exist before it authorizes detention. In the context of non-compliant and
drug and alcohol using pregnant women, the state cannot meet this
standard. Therefore, any detention for the sake of fetal health is
unconstitutional.
B. Reproductive Rights: The Right to Privacy and Bodily Integrity
Conventionally, the right to privacy is the right to be left alone and
to be free from state interference in decisions that pertain to one's self-
definition. This notion also posits that privacy is an essential prerequisite to
both personhood and citizenship, "encompassing such notions as autonomy,
liberty of conscience, self-determination, and individual identity. ' 154 This
understanding of privacy protects the right to be different or, in other words,
the right to define our own identities. Jed Rubenfeld appropriately argues
that, "In personhood's own view, the right to privacy protects iconoclasm; it
allows people to define themselves in defiance of certain widely held,
deeply entrenched values." 1 55 Because the protection of privacy can
negatively affect others, Rubenfeld further asserts that this understanding of
privacy can "offer[] a balancing test as its governing principle. The test
would weigh the importance of certain conduct to an individual's identity
against the importance of the state interest being served by the law
restricting the conduct. 1 56 In this view, the state can nevertheless limit or
153 See American Medical Association Board of Trustees, supra note 28;
Committee on Substance Abuse, American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 29, at 366
("[W]hen [anti-drug] education fails, effective drug treatment programs should be made
readily available to pregnant women .... [The Academy] is concerned that ... involuntary
measures may discourage mothers and their infants from receiving crucial medical care and
social support.); American Public Health Association, supra note 29 (recommending
educational programs, outpatient program referrals, and development of treatment facilities,
and rejecting punitive measures).
154 Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 124
(1992); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 886-96 (1978)
(discusses rights of privacy in the context of personhood).
155 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737, 759 (1989).
"' Id. at 760.
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destroy the freedom to procreate and to avoid procreation, protected by the
right of privacy and characterized by the Supreme Court as "one of the
basic civil rights of man,"' 57 if the state interest is compelling and no lesser
restrictive means are available to accomplish the legitimate or compelling
aims of the state.1
58
Reproductive rights then, are protected in most instances from state
interference and coercion under the doctrine of privacy. Discussing privacy
in the context of contraception, Justice Brennan asserted that "[if] the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual . . . to be free
from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether or not to bear or beget a child.' 59
Procreation is a fundamental right that the state can only regulate if the state
interest in regulation is compelling and no less restrictive means are
available. In the arena of reproduction, the Court has only found these
factors satisfied in a single context: the abortion of a viable fetus. Although
abortion cannot be prohibited by the state unless the fetus is viable, the
Court has allowed regulation of abortion so long as the regulation is not
unduly burdensome.' 60 However, the facts offered in the cases and statutes
presented herein (the use of the state's parens patriae power, the use of
civil commitment statutes, and the incarceration of drug-dependent women)
are not analogous to cases involving the abortions of viable fetuses. Neither
do they fit into the narrow exception carved out in the Court's privacy
jurisprudence allowing state intervention. Hence, in the regulation of
pregnant women's behavior, the state must be held to the high standard
articulated by the Court in other privacy cases regarding women's
reproductive decision making and rights.
Accordingly, the Court's privacy jurisprudence presents a line of
argument that contravenes state detention of pregnant women for the sake
of fetal health. The Court has proffered two different standards of review
157 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that a statute requiring
sterilization of some classes of criminals but not others is unconstitutional as discriminatory
under the Equal Protection Clause).
158 See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205-07 (1927) (This case upheld a
Virginia statute which permitted the nonconsensual sterilization of a woman deemed "feeble-
minded" to prevent the birth of "feeble-minded" children who might lead lives of crime or
indigency. The Court writes that "Three generations of imbeciles are enough.").
159 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
160 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77
(1992).
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with respect to reproductive rights: one for contraception issues and another
for abortion issues. 16 1 Although the Court's abortion jurisprudence does not
apply to the detention and civil commitment of pregnant women for the
sake of fetal health, a close analysis of the undue burden standard used in
abortion cases nevertheless demonstrates that such detentions violate
pregnant women's rights of privacy. That is, even under the Court's undue
burden standard, which allows greater state intervention, the confinement
and detention of pregnant women for the benefit of fetal health unduly
burdens a pregnant woman's privacy rights, including the right to be free
from government intrusion, coercion, or physical restriction on account of
pregnancy.
1. The Right to Be Free From Government Coercion in The Context of
Reproduction and Reproductive Decision Making: The Court's
Contraception Jurisprudence
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that the United
States Constitution protected married couples' use of contraception from
state intrusion. 162 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, held that the
right of privacy was a fundamental right implicit in the Bill of Rights,
specifically the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.
63
Moreover, for Justice Douglas the right of privacy was not primarily about
avoiding procreation or making reproductive choices. Rather, the right to
privacy reflects the need to protect married couples from state intrusion into
161 In other contexts, I have made the argument that the proper standard for
analyzing cases of reproductive decision making outside of the context of abortion is to
understand these decisions simply as medical decision making, protected by the individual's
constitutional liberty interest in bodily integrity and in refusing unwanted medical treatment.
See Cherry, Roe's Legacy, supra note 108. 1 continue to believe that this is certainly true in
the context of the compelled medical treatment of pregnant women. But some of the
aforementioned paradigmatic cases present a slightly different challenge. The criminal
detention and civil commitment cases are not only about the protection of reproductive
decision making. They are also about the protection of other choices (even though they may
not be among the healthiest of choices), and more importantly for this essay, the protection
of women from physical coercion of the state for the benefit of another-the fetus.
162 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
163 Id. at 484. Fundamental rights are rights that the Court deems to be "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" so
that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Anita L. Allen,
Autonomy's Magic Wand: Abortion and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. REV. 683,
687 (1992); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
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their "home and . . . privacies of life," and the need to protect them from
state coercion. 164 Eisenstadt v. Baird extended the right of privacy
articulated in Griswold to protect unmarried adults' contraceptive use.1 6 5 In
Eisenstadt, the Court clearly recognized the individual's right to purchase
and use contraception, thereby recognizing his or her right to make
decisions concerning procreation.'
66
At the very least, Griswold and Eisenstadt articulate a constitutional
right to engage in reproductive decision making. Detention, confinement,
and threats thereof for the benefit of the fetus may discourage women from
procreating or encourage some women to abort their fetuses to avoid
incarceration. As such, these state actions violate pregnant women's right to
privacy under the rubric articulated in Griswold and Eisenstadt and are
therefore unconstitutional. These Supreme Court cases also reiterate a
theme in constitutional jurisprudence affirming the inappropriateness of
state coercion in individual decision making. 167 Under either understanding
of these cases, judicial or legislative coercion, particularly in the form of
detention or commitment, is inappropriate and unconstitutional.
2. Casey v. Population Services: The Right to be Free from Unduly
Burdensome Government Regulation ofAbortion
The privacy principle articulated in Griswold and Eisenstadt was
further extended to include a woman's right to abort a non-viable fetus. In
Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that state interference with women's
decision making regarding abortion of a non-viable fetus was invalid.
168
The Court reasoned that because abortion of a non-viable fetus was indeed a
fundamental right, any state regulation restricting abortion had to pass strict
scrutiny. 69 Since the state's interest in the fetus did not become
164 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)).
165 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
166 Id. at 453.
167 BREYER, supra note 7, at 5; cf Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
485 U.S. 439, 450 (1989) (holding that only state action that coerces individual to act
contrary to her religious beliefs is constitutionally impermissible under free exercise clause).
168 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
169 Id. at 152-53.
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"compelling" until viability, any state action restricting abortion before fetal
viability was deemed presumptively invalid.17°
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the
Court abandoned this presumption. 7' The Casey Court articulated a new
standard. It held that a regulation will fail to meet a constitutional challenge
only if it places a substantial burden on a woman's right to have an
abortion. If the reviewing court does not deem the regulation to place a
substantial or undue burden on the woman seeking to access abortion
services, it must then assess the constitutional validity of the regulation with
a rational relationship review to determine whether the state's regulation is
rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in preserving potential
life. 172 In Casey, abortion clinics and physicians challenged, on substantive
due process grounds, the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania abortion
statute. 
73
Although the Court's commitment to stare decisis led it to continue
to identify abortion as a "fundamental right,' ' 174 the Court in Casey
nevertheless destroyed many of the safeguards protecting women's right to
abortion that it had previously required under Roe.175 The Court found that
the trimester framework developed in Roe "misconceives the nature of the
pregnant woman's interest; and in practice it undervalues the State's interest
170 Id. at 162-63.
171 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
172 Justice O'Connor first suggested this standard in City ofAkron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) [hereinafter Akron I] (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
see also O'Connor's opinions in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) [hereinafter Akron II]; Webster v. Reprod.
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). In Akron I, Justice O'Connor stated that a statute
imposes an undue burden only if it imposes absolute obstacles or severe limitations. Akron I,
462 U.S. at 464 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She has since moderated her position. See Casey,
505 U.S. at 988-89.
... Casey, 505 U.S. 833. The statute included the following provisions: a
mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period; an informed consent provision; a requirement
for a physician-delivered, government-directed litany of information, including the
availability of additional information providing in great detail the fetus' development, the
possibility of state-funded prenatal care, and the liability of the man who impregnated the
woman for child support; parental consent for minors; a reporting requirement mandating
that information about each abortion be reported to the state; and a spousal notification
provision. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (1990). See also Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
14 Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
175 Id. at 872.
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in potential life."' 76 Accordingly, the Casey Court rejected the application
of strict scrutiny, the standard traditionally used to evaluate the
constitutionality of abortion regulations. Instead, the Court adopted the
undue burden test, an intermediate form of review. Under this intermediate
form of review, the Court questions only whether the state regulation at
issue has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking the abortion of a non-viable fetus. 17 7 As the court
stated, "[a] statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by
the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform
the woman's free choice, not hinder it.' 78 As Casey and later lower court
decisions would demonstrate, the category of regulations and restrictions
that are unduly burdensome is rather small. Only those regulations that have
"a 'severe' or 'drastic' impact on the availability of legal abortion or
absolutely vetoes a woman's choice" will be found unconstitutional. 79
176 id.
177 Martha Field has argued that the "establishment of this new constitutional
framework with which to evaluate the constitutionality of abortion regulation" is probably
the most significant holding of Casey. Martha Field, Abortion Law Today, 14 J. LEGAL MED.
3, 12-13 (1993).
As I, and others, have previously noted, the "unduly burdensome" standard of the
Court seems to be more conclusory than a clearly articulated analytical framework. See, e.g.,
April L. Cherry, A Feminist Understanding of Sex-Selective Abortion, supra note 8, at 223;
see also Sheldon Gelman, "Life " and "Liberty ": Their Original Meaning, Historical
Antecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate over Abortion Rights, 78 MIrNN. L. REV.
585, 608 (1994).
Moreover, in their 1991 article, Mediating the Polar Extremes: A Guide to Post-
Webster Policy, Richard Wilkins, Richard Sherlock, and Steven Clark speculated that three
factors would influence the Court's decision of whether an abortion regulation is unduly
burdensome. Wilkins et al. posit that in order for a regulation to avoid being found unduly
burdensome: (1) it must be firmly grounded in an articulated state interest; (2) it must not
completely bar access to abortion services; and (3) it must actually further the articulated
state interest. Many scholars have argued that the unduly burdensome standard is inherently
unworkable. Richard G. Wilkins et. al., Mediating the Polar Extremes: A Guide to Post-
Webster Policy, 1991 BYU L. REV. 403, 440 (1991). Elizabeth A. Schneider, for example,
asserts that the new standard is unworkable because it "invite[s] courts to ground their
decisions in judges' subjective analysis. This becomes especially problematic when judges
have limited knowledge about the availability of abortion" and because the test fails to assess
each woman's individual needs in the unique situation of an abortion. Elizabeth A.
Schneider, Comment, Workability of the Undue Burden Test, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 1003,
1031-34 (1993).
178 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
179 Sylvia A. Law, Abortion Compromise: Inevitable and Impossible, 1992 U. ILL.
L. REV. 921, 924 (1992) (citing City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 464 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of
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Regulations that are found not to unduly burden a woman's right to access
abortion services but rather are designed to persuade her to choose
childbirth over abortion are analyzed under the reasonable relationship
standard, and, as a result, will almost always be deemed constitutional.180
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area seems clear on this
point. The Court has yet to interpret the Constitution as creating an
affirmative obligation upon the state to provide the necessary conditions in
which citizens can freely exercise abortion rights.' 81 Instead, the Court
informs us that the state will only be prohibited from acting in ways that
deny citizens the right to avoid reproduction through the use of
contraception and abortion, and then only in some circumstances. The
Court's jurisprudence seems clear on a second point as well. The Court
believes that the Constitution allows the state to discourage the exercise of
reproductive rights so long as the state's obstacles do not operate as a bar.
The "funding cases" reinforce the understanding of the nature of
reproductive rights as negative, protecting the individual from state
interference,18 2 while the constitutionality of informed consent provisions
serves as evidence that state-created obstacles are permitted so long as the
Obstetricians & Gynecologists (ACOG), 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
180 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78. The arguments made by the Court in the plurality
opinion in Casey echo its author's, Justice O'Connor, position in earlier abortion cases. For
example, in Thornburgh v. ACOG, Justice O'Connor in her dissent argues:
Under this Court's fundamental-rights jurisprudence, judicial scrutiny of
state regulation of abortion should be limited to whether the state law
bears a rational relationship to legitimate purposes such as the
advancement of these compelling interests [ensuring maternal health and
in protecting potential human life], with heightened scrutiny reserved for
instances in which the state has imposed an "undue burden" on the
abortion decision . . . . An undue burden will generally be found "in
situations involving absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the
abortion decision" not whether a state regulation "may 'inhibit' abortions
to some degree."
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Akron 1, 462 U.S. 416, 463-
64 (1983)). See also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 687 (1977) (abortion
regulation not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion).
181 Cherry, Roe's Legacy, supra note 108, at 725.
182 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 809-10
(2d ed. 2002).
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obstacle acts solely as a deterrent and not as an absolute bar.' 83 Both types
of regulations are constitutional under the standard articulated in Casey.
a. No Affirmative State Obligation: Prohibitions on the Public Funding of
Abortion
The state can still achieve some of its goals by failing to provide
assistance to pregnant women who make choices the state finds undesirable.
Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae are important to our understanding of
the undue burden standard. Although these cases were decided long before
Casey, they nevertheless rest on the notion of undue burden; that is, as long
as the government action does not act as a bar to abortion, the regulation is
constitutionally permitted. In Maher, the Court considered whether the
fundamental abortion right included a right to state funding of medically
unnecessary abortions when the state funded prenatal and child birthing
services. 184 In overturning the district court's holding that the regulation that
authorized unequal funding violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court stated that the district court had
"misconceived the nature and the scope of the fundamental right recognized
in Roe."' 185 The Maher Court read Roe as doing no more than "protect[ing]
the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy."'1 86 Ultimately, the Court held
that the state's "value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and...
implement[ing] that judgment by the allocation of public funds,"' 87 did not
amount to an undue burden, even if the result was that indigent women
would be unable to access abortion services as a result of their poverty. 188
As is often quoted, the Court noted:
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers from
no disadvantage as a consequence of [the state's] decision
to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent
on private sources for the service she desires. The State
183 Id. at 803.
184 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466 (1977).
'
85 Id. at 471.
186 Id. at 473-74.
117 Id. at 474.
188 Id.
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may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative,
thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has
imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not
already there. The indigency that may make it difficult-
and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women
to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected
by the [state] regulation. 189
Similarly, in Harris, the Court considered whether the Hyde
Amendment, which severely limits the use of federal monies for the
reimbursement of medically necessary abortions under Medicaid, was
unconstitutional on the grounds that by denying funding for abortion, the
statute denies poor women access to abortion and hence impinges on a
fundamental right. 90 Again, the Court held that such governmental policies
were not unduly burdensome of women's abortion right. The Harris Court
stated:
Regardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose
to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons lies at the
core or the periphery of the due process liberty recognized
in [Roe], it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom
of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the
financial resources to avail herself of the full range of
protected choices .... [A]lthough the government may not
place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her
freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own
creation. Indigency falls in the latter category.
191
Hence, burdens that are not caused by direct state action are constitutionally
permissible even if they act as an absolute barrier to the exercise of a
fundamental right. The Court concluded that because the funding scheme
imposed no governmental restrictions (or no undue burden) on women's
access to abortion, the fundamental rights analysis was not appropriate.
92
Instead the court applied the rational basis test. It looked to see if the
government restriction was rationally related to its objective; concluding
189 Id.
190 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).
191 Id. at 317.
192 Maher, 432 U.S. at 475.
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that it was so related, the Court held that there was no constitutional
violation. 193
b. An Obstacle, Not a Bar. The Constitutionality of Informed Consent and
Waiting Period Provisions
Because the state's interest in the life of the fetus is "substantial,"
the state can regulate abortion under the undue burden standard as
articulated in Casey as long as the purpose or effect of the statute does not
place a "substantial obstacle" in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of
a non-viable fetus. 194 Hence, the state may enact measures that are designed
to persuade a woman to choose childbirth over abortion even if those
measures are solely "persuasive" in nature and in no way further a health
interest. 95 However, the state may use only those means "calculated to
inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it."' 96 As Justice O'Connor
stated:
What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate
decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing
so. Regulation which does no more than create a structural
mechanism by which the state ... may express profound
respect for the life of the unborn is permitted, if they are not
a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right
to choose.' 97
In applying the undue burden standard to the informed consent
provisions of the Pennsylvania abortion statute and overruling its earlier
decisions in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health'98 and
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,'99 the
'9' Id. at 475-76.
194 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
195 Id. at 886.
'9' id. at 877.
197 id.
"' 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
'99 Thornburgh v. ACOG, 476 U.S. 747, 764 (1986). In Thornburgh, the Court
held that, "[t]his type of compelled information is the antithesis of informed consent." Id. at
764.
20071
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Casey Court upheld the provisions. The Court found that the informed
consent provision of the Pennsylvania statute furthers the legitimate state
goal "of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to
discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her
decision was not fully informed."200 As long as the information that the
state requires to be made available to the woman is not misleading, the
statute does not amount to an undue burden to a woman seeking an
abortion z. 0
In sum, the Casey Court articulated a new standard for laws and
regulations that restrain the abortion decision. With regard to the non-viable
fetus, instead of requiring the state to meet the burden of strict scrutiny by
demonstrating that its interest is compelling and that its action is narrowly
tailored to protect that interest, the state must only demonstrate that its
restraint does not unduly burden the individual woman's right to abortion.
Ultimately, the state may regulate the abortion of a not-yet-viable fetus so
long as the state does not place a substantial obstacle in the way of a woman
pursuing an abortion. With regard to a viable fetus, the state may prohibit
its abortion because the state's interest becomes compelling at the point of
viability; the only way to preserve the state's interest is to prohibit abortion
at that point.
Since the undue burden standard allows for greater state
intervention than the Roe standard did, the unduly burdensome standard can
be understood as a standard meant to protect pregnant women from only the
most serious forms of state coercion, of which prevention of decision
making is but one form. In other words, in order to determine whether the
state has unduly burdened a woman's abortion, privacy, or liberty right, two
questions need to be asked. The first is the question asked by the Casey
Court: does the law prevent reproductive decision making? This Article
argues that the second question is the broader one implied by the Court:
does the state action result in any impermissible form of coercion?
What remains to be answered with regard to the violation of
reproductive rights is whether the detention, confinement, or commitment
of a pregnant woman for the benefit of fetal health is unduly burdensome.
Does this state intervention prevent reproductive decision making, or does it
subject pregnant women to a serious form of state coercion through threats
and the loss of liberty? If the state action results in either outcome, it should
be deemed unconstitutional under the undue burden standard.
200 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
211 Id. at 883.
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3. Detention and Commitment of Pregnant Women for the Sake of Fetal
Health is Unduly Burdensome
The detention and commitment of pregnant women for the benefit
of fetal health, and threats thereof, are highly coercive and as such prevent
reproductive decision making. To determine whether state action unduly
burdens reproductive decision making, Casey instructs us to ask whether
the state action hinders the woman's decision making or whether the state
action is highly coercive. Further, as noted in Maher and McRae, the
obstacle is only impermissible if it is of the state's making.20 2 Any highly
coercive state measure that creates a double bind for the woman and
subjects her to censure or deprivation regardless of the option she
chooses 20 3 should be deemed to be unduly burdensome of the woman's
reproductive, privacy, and liberty rights under the reasoning in Casey.
Detention and commitment in this context are highly coercive to
reproductive decision making. Coercion in this context is problematic
because it violates the value of autonomous decision making, a value that is
at the heart of our traditional understanding of the privacy doctrine. Both
contraception and abortion cases, including Casey, clearly articulate that the
decision whether or not to bear a child is the woman's alone until fetal
viability. It is not the state's decision. By allowing detention and
commitment for the benefit of fetal health, the state takes a significant part
of that decision making away from the woman. The state tells the pregnant
woman who is drug or alcohol dependent or who wants to make
unconventional decisions about the birth of her child that she undergo the
pregnancy in the way mandated by the state or be subject to incarceration or
other form of state detention. This action by the state does not simply make
procreation decision making more difficult; it makes decision making
impossible for some. It means that some women will be forced into
"choosing" between procreation and incarceration. Others will "choose"
between abortion and incarceration. Neither option amounts to much of a
choice. Regardless of the choice made, these women will be subjected to
some sort of serious state censure that will result in the deprivation of their
liberty.
202 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466 (1977) (poverty is an obstacle not of the
state's making); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 356 (1980) (same).
203 Marilyn Frye, Oppression, in THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST
THEORY (1983).
20071
HeinOnline  -- 16 Colum. J. Gender & L. 191 2007
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law
The second question posed above, whether state action results in an
impermissible form of coercion, must be answered by a more in-depth
analysis of the privacy right itself
III. PRIVACY AS AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION OR ANTI-
TOTALITARIAN PRINCIPLE
A. Privacy as Mandating an Affirmative State Obligation
The personhood theory of privacy articulated earlier in this article
represents the most prevalent interpretation of the privacy doctrine.204
Nevertheless, conceptualizing the right to privacy as creating an affirmative
obligation on the part of the state to assist in creating the conditions under
which meaningful, uncoerced, and independent decision making can occur,
is another way of understanding the privacy doctrine. Undoubtedly, the
Fourteenth Amendment similarly has been interpreted as requiring an
affirmative state obligation to ensure that equality is fostered and protected
in order for people to develop the characteristics necessary for good
citizenship.20 5 Under this analysis, privacy at its smallest mandate must
foster conditions under which meaningful decision making can take
place. 206 Protecting individuals from state coercion-in this case, state
endorsed forms of mothering-or the coercion of others, must be an integral
part of privacy's promise. Detaining pregnant women for the protection of
fetal health is highly coercive. Detention amounts to putting pregnant
women in a classic double bind where none of their possible responses are
fair or acceptable. This use of state power to detain and confine coerces
every pregnancy related decision. The women in these circumstances can
either abort their fetuses, follow the state prescribed practices, or be subject
to the physical control of the state for the duration of their pregnancies.
Thus, at the very least, such coercive practices like the detention of
pregnant women for the benefit of their fetuses should be deemed
impermissible under this conception of privacy.
204 See supra Section I.B.
205 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
206 Susan James, The Good Enough Citizen: Female Citizenship and
Independence, in BEYOND EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE: CITIZENSHIP, FEMINIST POLITICS, AND
FEMALE SUBJECTIVITY 48-65, 51 (Gisela Bock & Susan James eds., 1992).
[Vol. 16:1
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B. An Anti-totalitarian Analysis of Privacy
Jed Rubenfeld proposes yet another conception or understanding of
the right to privacy. Rubenfeld argues that the right protected by privacy is
"the fundamental freedom not to have one's life too totally determined by a
progressively more normalizing state." 207 In other words, Rubenfeld
believes that the rights or freedoms protected by privacy are those that
protect individuals from the power of the state to control their lives. In
addition, privacy as an anti-totalitarian principle "prevents the state from
imposing on individuals a defined identity.",208 Therefore, privacy protects
individuals from a state that might treat its citizens as instrumentalities. °9
Because he views the purpose and the content of the right to privacy
slightly differently than the received wisdom of the personhood theory,
Rubenfeld posits a different analysis. He believes that to better understand
the contours of the right to privacy, we need not look at what the law
prohibits when determining whether it violates the right to privacy. Instead,
we should examine what is produced by the law. Rubenfeld argues that we
must consider the affirmative aspects of the law or regulation at issue and
determine whether the effect of the law is "to direct and occupy" the lives
of individuals. 210 He asks whether the law at issue "operate[s] in any way to
confine, normalize, and functionalize identity[.],, 211 If the law operates in
such a manner, then it violates the fundamental right to privacy.
In testing his thesis, Rubenfeld considers the anti-abortion
regulations at issue in Roe v. Wade and subsequent cases. He tries to
determine what these laws produce. Do they confine, normalize, or
functionalize women? He argues that these regulations violate privacy, but
not because women are to be protected against state interference in personal
decisions since the state interferes in the personal lives of its citizens much
of the time. Rather, he argues that these regulations violate the privacy
rights of women because of what they produce. They confine women to the
role of motherhood with its inevitable concomitant physical, emotional,
economic, and political ramifications. In sum, these laws violate privacy
because they produce forced motherhood, a "pronounced bodily
207 Rubenfeld, supra note 155, at 784.
218 Id. at 794.
209 I. at 790-91.
210 Id. at 740.
211 Id. at 788.
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intervention," as well as treating women as mere instrumentalities of the
state.21 2 Rubenfeld asserts:
Anti-abortion laws produce motherhood: they take diverse
women with every variety of career, life-plan, and so on, and
make mothers of them all. To be sure, motherhood is no unitary
phenomenon that is experienced alike by all women.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine a state-enforced rule whose
ramifications within the actual, everyday life of the act are more
far-reaching .... [I]t creates a perceived identity for women and
confines them to it; and it gathers up a multiplicity of approaches
to the problem of being a woman and reduces them all to the
single norm of motherhood.213
But what is the danger of standardization? Rubenfeld argues that
the danger of standardization is the resulting treatment of individuals as
"mere instruments of the state, rather than as citizens with independent
minds who themselves constitute the state., 214 Standardization and
instrumentalization are both products of anti-abortion laws. These
developments force women to bear children for the state and in the process
become "maternal environments, '2 5 instead of women with interests of
their own, including interests in their own bodies and their own lives. The
effect of standardization and instrumentalization are also products of the
detention and confinement of pregnant women for the sake of fetal health.
Indeed, the Wisconsin statute permitting involuntary confinement actually
refers to pregnant women as "maternal environments. 216
The anti-totalitarian analysis proffered by Rubenfeld provides us
with the opportunity to think in new ways about whether the detention,
confinement, and commitment of pregnant women for the benefit of fetal
health violates the right to privacy. If Rubenfeld is correct, and the proper
analysis involves determining what is produced instead of looking at what
activities are prohibited by the state action, then we must ask what is
occurring in the context of the detention and confinement of pregnant
women? Much like Rubenfeld's analysis of anti-abortion laws, we find that
212 Id. at 788.
213 id.
214 Id. at 790.
215 WIs. STAT § 48.133 (2005).
216 id
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the state action in detention and confinement produces a "pronounced
bodily intervention," an obvious bodily seizure, and imposes a defined
identity upon women.
Many of the detentions of pregnant women produce a "pronounced
bodily intervention." The most apparent of these bodily interventions occur
when pregnant women are confined to hospitals and ordered to have
medical procedures to benefit their fetuses. The hospital detention with its
attendant invasion of bodily integrity for surgery or other medical
procedures for the health of the fetus produces a "pronounced bodily
intervention on the pregnant woman."
Moreover, the detention and confinement of pregnant women for
the benefit of fetal health produces bodily seizures. When pregnant women
are detained in hospitals, mental health facilities, jails, or prisons for the
purported benefit of fetal health, they obviously are not free to leave when
they wish. In addition, they must then rely upon these state institutions for
both their basic physical needs and any special needs resulting from the
pregnancy. All forms of detention physically confine women's identity. The
bodily seizures produced by the detentions reduce pregnant women to
something less than a free citizen. Bodily seizures impose on pregnant
women a defined identity-that of a bad or unacceptable mother, one not
permitted the freedom of movement or decision. Detention signals that
women's physical autonomy will not be protected unless women conform
to state sanctioned mothering standards.
Lastly, the detention and confinement of pregnant women for the
sake of fetal health produce and impose upon women a defined identity-a
state legitimized form of motherhood. This form of motherhood requires
that women be selfless. It requires mothers to be self-sacrificing with the
penalty of state detention. Hence, the threat of detention is unlawful
because coercion in this context substantially shapes women's lives by
creating a normalized state-sanctioned motherhood identity for women. The
creation of this identity goes hand in hand with treating pregnant women as
instruments of the state whose duty is to produce healthy children.
If Rubenfeld is correct in asserting that the right to privacy is "the
fundamental freedom not to have one's life too totally determined by a
progressively more normalizing state, ' 217 then the deprivation of pregnant
women's physical and decisional liberty for the purported benefit of the
fetus must violate the privacy right. With the detention and commitment of
pregnant women for the sake of fetal health, the state seeks to "direct and
occupy" the lives of pregnant women and to treat them as instruments of the
state. In the end, the result is a normalized, state-defined way of mothering.
217 Rubenfeld, supra note 155, at 784.
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It is this state-enforced normalization that is prevented by the protection of
privacy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Judges and legislatures have used the deprivation of physical
liberty, and threats thereof, as a way to prevent drug use by pregnant
addicts, to compel pregnant women to access prenatal care, or to force
women to submit to their physicians' directions regarding medical
treatment for the benefit of fetal health. In every case, the detention of the
pregnant woman was predicated upon the "right" of fetuses to be born
healthy.
Even if the restriction of the physical liberty of pregnant women is
well-meaning, it is unwise because it deters the pregnant women who most
need prenatal care from receiving it. The restriction of the physical liberty
of pregnant women is also unconstitutional because it results in an
inappropriate restriction on women's right to be free from unwarranted
physical restriction and on their privacy and liberty rights to reproductive
decision making free of unwarranted state interference. Accordingly,
detention, confinement, and incarceration of pregnant women for the
benefit of fetal health violate women's constitutional rights and leave us
with a jurisprudence of physical integrity and reproductive rights that
permits highly coercive action on the part of the state into one of the most
intimate decisions and experiences of women. If the state is permitted to
detain and confine pregnant women for the benefit of fetal health, women
are reduced to nothing more than fetal containers whose rights and liberties
are dependent upon their acquiescence to mothering rules dictated by the
state.
Finally, if the health of the fetus is of central concern, more
attention must be given to the health of women, poor women in particular.
The experts in this area must be listened to, including experts from the
public health and medical communities and the women themselves, who
can best attest to their needs. Most importantly, there needs to be a wider
availability of quality prenatal care that is inexpensive or free without the
threat of confinement and more drug and alcohol treatment facilities that
treat pregnant women. While these suggestions are not cost free, they are no
more expensive than incarcerating and confining women during their
pregnancies or treating infants born with problems resulting from prenatal
21
exposure to drugs or alcohol, or insufficient prenatal care.18 Without proper
218 National Committee for Quality Assurance, Prenatal and Postpartum Care,
The State of Managed Care Quality, 2001, www.ncqa.org/somc200l/prenatal/somc
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attention paid to the needs of pregnant women, fetal health will be at risk.
The force of law cannot solve this problem. It can only be solved by a
public policy that reflects a commitment to the real health needs of both
women and children.
_2001_ppc.html (noting that based on hospital claims, the estimated cost of post natal care
for women without pre-natal care was twice as much as the post natal care of a woman who
received pre-natal care).
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